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## Transitional Justice and Acceptance of Cohabitation in Cyprus

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## Transitional Justice and Acceptance of Cohabitation in Cyprus

### Abstract

This article draws on the case of Cyprus to initiate a discussion on the acceptance of renewed cohabitation in post-conflict societies. Besides focusing on the two main communities on the island, the article also examines for the first time the views of the IDPs as well as the settler/migrant community. We identify variations in support for acceptance of renewed cohabitation across different population groups, looking at age, gender, income, refugee status, contact and past victimization within each group. In Study 1, we consider Greek Cypriot attitudes to the Turkish settler/migrant community and juxtapose those with attitudes to indigenous Turkish Cypriots. In Study 2, we compare Turkish Cypriots and settlers aiming to evaluate their attitudes towards Greek Cypriots. Contrary to the dominant narratives, individual victimization, except a tendency related to the IDP status, does not account for variations in acceptance of cohabitation; our findings suggest that those who support peace amnesties are more likely to demonstrate tolerance towards outgroup members while highlighting quality of intergroup *contact* as a key causal mechanism in mitigating intergroup intolerance.

*Keywords:* Transitional Justice, Intergroup Contact, Internally Displaced Persons, Forced migration, Cyprus Issue

## Introduction

The major innovation in this article is the focus on specific population of sub-groups in Cyprus, namely the post-1974 settlers/migrants and the 1963-1974 victims of ethnic cleansing (i.e. the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)) analysing their perceptions of others, as well as how they are being viewed by members of the other communities. Departing from this special issue's focus on 'long-distance' diasporas, we also introduce a case of a settler community that is instead 'adjacent to its kin-state territory'. Despite decades-long negotiations on these issues, it has never been empirically tested whether Greek Cypriots, including those internally displaced since 1974, would be willing to live as neighbours with Turkish Cypriots as well as settlers. To address this gap, we utilize two surveys in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities drawing insights from the transitional justice and forced migration literatures. As argued elsewhere (Kovras, 2017:5; Hall et al. 2018), the mainstream literature on transitional justice has so far maintained a narrow scope, often treating different victims' groups as homogenous, assuming uniform transitional justice preferences. Focusing on various demographic groups in Cyprus, our analysis aims to address this gap in the academic and policy literature.

Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, approximately 162,000 Greek Cypriots fled their cities and villages in the north, while around 45,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south moved to the north. These figures do not include earlier displacements particularly of Turkish Cypriots since 1963 and another 21,000 Greek Cypriots mainly from the Karpas Peninsula who fled despite the signing of the August 1975 Third Vienna Agreement aiming to protect those enclaved during the war (Demetriou 2018; Patrick 1976). Meanwhile, Turkish settlers were encouraged to inhabit the occupied northern part of Cyprus (Sonan, Vural, and Ekenoglou, 2015). Further complicating the dispute, post-1974 settlers who constitute about

1  
2  
3 one third of the electorate in the north (Hatay 2005) as well as Turkish Cypriots displaced from  
4  
5 the south took properties belonging to Greek Cypriot IDPs.<sup>1</sup>  
6  
7

8 Although in the decades that followed the 1974 partition both communities have  
9  
10 attempted to develop reconciliation narratives, their perceptions have diverged across preferred  
11  
12 solutions. While Greek Cypriots had a greater tendency to speak about return, Turkish Cypriots  
13  
14 defended the post-1974 realities and demographic changes in the northern part of the island.  
15  
16 Besides the specific processes available to actors in Cyprus, we argue that the findings largely  
17  
18 reflect the ‘clustered discourses on transitional justice’ (Orjuela 2018) around which each  
19  
20 community has rallied during the last half century.<sup>2</sup> For these reasons, Cyprus provides an ideal  
21  
22 case to integrate the forced migration and transitional justice literatures that so far have failed  
23  
24 to share insights in addressing intractable conflicts.  
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27

28 Cyprus also has the potential to pave the way for the resolution of such conflicts as well  
29  
30 as offer insights as to how intergroup contact could facilitate the acceptance of cohabitation.  
31  
32 During the 2015-2017 round of negotiations between the leaders of the two communities in  
33  
34 Cyprus, there have been few positive convergences. For one thing, the leaders have effectively  
35  
36 agreed that most of the settlers from Turkey who have already been granted citizenship by the  
37  
38 internationally non-recognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would  
39  
40 automatically become citizens of a reunited Cyprus. Although the property issues of those  
41  
42 displaced is still left unresolved, the leaders have also agreed to remove restrictions on  
43  
44 population movements, thereby enabling IDPs returning home. Unsurprising, the proposed  
45  
46 naturalization of settlers has been fiercely debated in the Greek Cypriot public sphere by  
47  
48 political parties opposing a settlement while Turkish Cypriots fear the return of Greek Cypriot  
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56  
57 <sup>1</sup> Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are also commonly referred to as refugees in official  
58 Greek Cypriot accounts

59 <sup>2</sup> See also Orjuela 2018 and discussion in the introduction to this special issue, Koinova and  
60 Karabegovic (2019).

1  
2  
3 IDPs. Given the convergence of the leaders and the aim of reaching sustainable peace in Cyprus  
4  
5 versus ongoing opposition to the peace settlement, it is important to explore the levels of  
6  
7 acceptance of living together with the 'other'. Unlike other divided societies such as Lebanon  
8  
9 or Northern Ireland, cohabitation in Cyprus will take a voluntary form (i.e. after decades of an  
10  
11 almost complete separation of the two communities those returning back to their homes will  
12  
13 do so if they wish to cohabit with the other community). To this end, return migration will  
14  
15 play a key role in the reconciliation of the two communities (see Hall et al. 2018) or  
16  
17 alternatively trigger new tensions, if the peace process lacks incentives for cooperation  
18  
19 (Lischer, 2015). To better understand these dynamics, we probe the attitudes of Greek Cypriots,  
20  
21 including those displaced by the war, and Turkish Cypriots, including Turkish settlers, to  
22  
23 cohabitation.  
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28  
29 Settlers in contested territories, in this case of Cyprus, are discussed here as a diaspora  
30  
31 adjacent to kin-state territories (Brubaker 1996; Salehyan 2007, Cederman et al. 2013; Koinova  
32  
33 2017) focusing particularly on efforts to mediate peace and transitional justice mechanisms.  
34  
35 Despite the widespread public perception that Greek Cypriot public opinion is largely opposed  
36  
37 to the presence of Turkish settlers, it has never been empirically tested whether Greek Cypriots,  
38  
39 including those internally displaced since 1974, would be willing to live as neighbours with  
40  
41 Turkish settlers. Nor, for that matter, do we know what Turkish Cypriots and settlers  
42  
43 themselves think of Greek Cypriots returning back to their ancestral lands. Settler politics are  
44  
45 not unique to the Cyprus conflict, and as argued elsewhere, they have presented significant  
46  
47 challenges in peace processes around the world. For instance, in the West Bank, the Mindanao  
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49 islands in the Philippines, and Tibet, settler politics evolved to the detriment of native  
50  
51 populations, resulting in violent conflict and resistance (Haklai & Loizides 2015). While settler  
52  
53 and migration studies offer specific categorizations, causal arguments and prescriptions  
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55 (Lustick 1985; Laitin 1998), only a handful have empirically tested related normative claims.  
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This is partly due to the absence of reliable survey data from affected communities, including displaced persons, settlers and the general population, especially surveys addressing transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms. We address this gap using new survey data collected from Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots of voting age, asking a series of questions targeted at the possibility of cohabitation in the event of a possible settlement.

We identify variations in support for acceptance of renewed cohabitation across different population groups, looking at age, gender, educational level and victimization status within each group. In Study 1, we consider Greek Cypriot attitudes to the Turkish settler community and juxtapose those with attitudes to indigenous Turkish Cypriots. In Study 2, we examine various groups of Turkish Cypriots, including settlers in Cyprus, and evaluate their attitudes to cohabitation with Greek Cypriots. The findings support the quality of intergroup contact as a factor facilitating acceptance of cohabitation. Contrary to the predominant beliefs in both communities, individual victimization resulting from the 1963-1974 conflicts, with the exception of a trend related to the IDP status, does not account for variations in acceptance of cohabitation. Based on the findings, we also discuss the potential impact of transitional justice interventions and intergroup contact while indicating how our work could influence future surveys aiming to better understand and influence cohabitation and sustainable peace.

## **Study 1**

### **Research Methods**

#### **Sample**

The study was conducted by the University Centre for Field Studies of the University of Cyprus in Nicosia, Cyprus, through telephone interviews using the NIPO/CATI program randomly selected from a directory and ran from 29 February 2016 to 22 March 2016. Participants came from both urban and rural areas in each district of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot

community). Eligible participants were over 18 years old with voting rights. The total sample included 1605 participants. The findings in this section are for the Greek Cypriot sample only.

## Questionnaire

The questionnaire took about 20 minutes to complete and consisted of five parts: A) demographic questions (gender, age, IDP status, place of residence in terms of district and area [rural or urban], educational level); B) socio-political questions on accepting a neighbour from a different outgroup, and relations with other displaced people; C) questions on views of transitional justice options; D) questions in binary form asking about war-related trauma. Participants who had either personally experienced displacement or whose parents were IDPs were asked to complete an additional set of questions capturing their return intentions and level of direct and indirect intergroup contact with Turkish Cypriots. A list of the variables and their description is in Appendix I in Supplementary material.

## Results

Our examination of the position of Greek Cypriots (hereafter GCs) regarding acceptance of a Turkish Cypriot (TC) or a Turkish settler (TS) as a close neighbour confirms the expectation that GCs strongly prefer TCs to TSs. A slight majority (56.6%) would certainly or probably accept a Turkish Cypriot as a close neighbour, but only a small minority (11.1%) would probably or certainly accept a TS as close neighbour. The position of internally displaced GCs is similar; whereas 56.7% would probably or certainly support a TC as neighbour, only 10.6 % would probably or certainly accept a Turkish settler.

Using hierarchical binary logistic regression, we divided the predictor variables into three sets: respondents' structural location/demographic profile (age, gender, education, etc.), war-time experiences (personal victimization and family member(s)' victimization),



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3 perception of justice (see Appendix 1) covering measures from all three major transitional  
4 justice schools (trials, truth, and amnesty; see Kovras, 2014, p.4).  
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7  
8 While the direction of causality is generally straightforward when studying the impact  
9 of structural variables on dependent variables, the relationship between the acceptance of  
10 ethnic others and the ideological profile of the respondent can be more complex. It makes little  
11 sense to assume the respondent's structural position (gender, age, etc.) is caused by his/her  
12 level of acceptance of an ethnic other, but it is plausible that, for example, a very strong level  
13 of rejection could lead the respondent to prefer retributive to restorative justice. Panel data  
14 could disentangle these causal complexities, but they are not available in this case. This issue  
15 must be taken into account when interpreting the findings of models with both structural and  
16 ideological variables (for a methodological explanation, see Cox and Wermuth 2001:66).  
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28 In Model 1 (Table 1), we test structural variables as predictors (gender, age, education,  
29 IDP status). Model 1 suggests males are more accepting of TCs than females, and the difference  
30 is statistically significant. Younger people are less likely to be accepting of TCs as neighbours  
31 than those born before 1974. Those without university education have roughly 0.75 lower odds  
32 of being accepting of TCs than those with university education. Interestingly, the non-displaced  
33 tend to be less accepting than the displaced.  
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42 Personal and family victimization (in the form of various forms of victimisation except  
43 displacement described in the Appendix 1) are entered in Model 2 separately as an additional  
44 block of variables but neither reliably predicts GCs acceptance of cohabitation with TCs.  
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49 Model 3 includes the set of variables relating to GC views on transitional justice. Some  
50 significant findings predict additional variance of the dependent variable over that explained  
51 by Models 1 and 2. As expected, those supporting amnesty and perpetrators giving testament  
52 to a truth and reconciliation committee and those in favour of leaving injustices in the past are  
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3 more accepting of TCs. Those demanding that perpetrators beg for forgiveness are less  
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5 accepting.  
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10 -----PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-----  
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16 Next, we test acceptance of TSs. In this case (Table 2) gender and age do not play a  
17  
18 role, reflecting the widespread homogeneous negative view of Turkish settlers in the Greek  
19  
20 Cypriot community. In this model, in contrast to the case for TCs in Table 1, the displaced are  
21  
22 less accepting of TSs than the non-displaced. However, as before, personal and family  
23  
24 victimization, except displacement, separately play no role. Interestingly, in Model 3, once the  
25  
26 transitional justice variables are entered as a block, we discover the same pattern as in Table 1  
27  
28 for TCs. However, the significant predictors differ somewhat. Amnesty is not significant, and  
29  
30 as we might expect, those who want Turkey to pay for damages are less accepting of TSs.  
31  
32 Finally, there is a tendency for individuals born after 1974 to be accepting of TSs, the opposite  
33  
34 of the age effect for TCs in Table 1.  
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39 -----PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-----  
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45 Given the large sample size of Study 1, we can focus on a subsample, the internally  
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47 displaced. This group answered two additional sets of questions, first on their return intentions  
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49 if the Cyprus issue is resolved, and second on their level of intergroup contact with TCs (see  
50  
51 Appendix I in supplementary material). Unfortunately, we could not run the same model on  
52  
53 acceptance of TSs, since only 48 Greek Cypriot IDPs accept Turkish settlers as close  
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55 neighbours.  
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Table 3 presents the results for Greek Cypriot IDPs. As Model 1 shows, IDP men are 1.65 times more likely than women to be accepting of TCs, regardless of age. Interestingly, lack of university education seems to roughly halve the odds of acceptance of TCs. In Model 2, traumatic victimization in addition to being an IDP, either personally or within the family, does not relate to acceptance of cohabitation with TCs. In Model 3, as expected, transitional justice variables influence acceptance of cohabitation in four of seven variables. Here, the demand for Turkey to pay compensation is positively related to acceptance. This could be interpreted as a reduction in blaming TCs vs Turks for the grievances related to the events of 1974. As expected, those who support testimonies in a truth and reconciliation committee are more accepting, along with those who support letting go of past grievances and looking to the future. Those who want criminals to pay compensation or to beg for forgiveness (Models 4 and 5) are less accepting of TCs as neighbours.

As expected, the inclusion of return intentions in Model 4 adds a significant amount of total explained variance. IDPs who are more likely to return are more accepting of TCs as neighbours than those less likely to return. In Model 5, the addition of intergroup contact variables also increases the total percentage of explained variance. Those who do not have direct speaking contact with TCs are half as likely to be accepting as those with such contact; those whose families do not have TC friends are also half as likely to be accepting of TCs as neighbours. The gender effect is non-significant in Models 3, 4 and 5; overall, men are more accepting and were also found to have lower retributive justice scores than women.

-----PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-----

## Study 2

### Research Methods

### Sample

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3 The study was conducted by the Prologue Consulting Ltd in the Turkish Cypriot  
4 community using a representative sample survey of 801 participants. Participants were over 18  
5 years old with voting rights. Fieldwork lasted from 23 November 2017 to 20 December 2017.  
6  
7 Participants were drawn from both urban and rural areas using multistage, stratified sampling.  
8  
9 The findings represent the views of various subsamples: native Turkish Cypriots; those of  
10  
11 mixed Turkish Cypriot and Turkish origin; those of Turkish origin born in Turkey with both  
12  
13 parents born in Turkey.  
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## 22 Questionnaire

23  
24 The questionnaire took about 45 minutes to complete and had 7 parts. Those relevant  
25 to the study are: A) demographic variables; B) displacement experience, return intentions under  
26 GC administration; C) quality and quantity of contact with Greek Cypriots; D) direct and  
27 indirect war-related experience (captured, displacement, injured, missing relatives); E)  
28 perceptions of appropriate transitional justice mechanisms. Given the face-to-face nature of the  
29 questionnaire, we were able to take more detailed measures of both quantity (how often  
30 respondents talk to Greek Cypriots under different settings, e.g., in the north, in the south, in  
31 bicomunal activities, in their neighbourhood etc.) and quality of contact (positive,  
32 cooperative, based on mutual respect etc.) with the other community (GC) than in Study 1. In  
33 addition, we could use this set of questions for the whole sample, not just IDPs. A list of the  
34 subsample of variables and their description appears in Appendix II in Supplementary material.  
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## 51 Results

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53 The following percentages of the various subcategories of voters in Turkish Cypriot  
54 elections are willing to have a GC as a neighbour: 41.6% of indigenous IDPs (i.e., TCs who  
55 were born in the south, and displaced to the north during the 1974 conflict); 27.2% of  
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3 indigenous non-IDPs; 45.6% of mixed background; 35.1% of Turkish settlers. The variation  
4  
5 between subcategories is not significant, as shown in Table 4.  
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### 10 *All Respondents*

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12 We perform hierarchical binary logistic regression analyses to predict whether Turkish  
13  
14 Cypriot voters will accept Greek Cypriots as neighbours and use Cox & Snell  $R^2$  values to  
15  
16 determine goodness-of-fit. First, we consider the full sample of survey respondents (Table 4).  
17  
18 In Model 1, only structural variables (ethnicity, gender, income, age, university education)  
19  
20 were entered as predictors. The responses of those of mixed background and indigenous TC  
21  
22 (either IDP or non-IDP) do not differ from those of the TSs used as a reference category. Higher  
23  
24 levels of income are predictive of increased likelihood of acceptance of cohabitation, and this  
25  
26 relationship is statistically significant. Females are roughly 1.3 times more likely to be  
27  
28 accepting of GC neighbours than males, albeit only significant at  $p < .10$ . Older age is a  
29  
30 significant predictor of lower acceptance of GCs, but university education is not.  
31  
32  
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34

35  
36 Model 2 adds war-time trauma experiences; neither self-endured nor close family-  
37  
38 endured trauma is significantly predictive. The pattern of prediction for the structural variables  
39  
40 remains the same as in Model 1, but age is non-significant in every subsequent model.  
41

42  
43 In Model 3, addition of the perceptions of justice variables demonstrates that those who  
44  
45 want GCs to receive amnesty are more likely to be accepting of GCs as neighbours. Those who  
46  
47 want them to beg for forgiveness, as well as those who want them to receive a fair trial and be  
48  
49 harshly punished if found guilty, are less likely to be accepting of cohabitation. Interestingly,  
50  
51 not having a university education significantly predicts lower likelihood of acceptance. Gender  
52  
53 and income remain predictive at  $p < .10$ .  
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56  
57 Model 4 adds quality and quantity of contact with GCs as predictors. While increased  
58  
59 quantity of contact somewhat reduces the levels of acceptance, increased quality of contact  
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3 almost doubles the likelihood of TCs accepting GCs as neighbours. Wanting amnesty predicts  
4 increased acceptance, while wanting a trial and punishment if found guilty or wanting GCs to  
5 beg for forgiveness predicts less acceptance. Gender and university education remain  
6 predictive in the same directions, but income is no longer a significant predictor.  
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15 -----PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-----  
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### 22 *Indigenous Turkish Cypriots*

23  
24 We run predictive models for indigenous Turkish Cypriot respondents (Table 5). Model  
25 1 includes structural variables as predictors. Higher income predicts increased acceptance of  
26 GCs as neighbours. Not having a university education predicts lower levels of acceptance.  
27  
28  
29

30 Model 2 includes trauma experiences as a predictive factor. While self-endured trauma  
31 experiences do not significantly predict acceptance, not having a close family member who  
32 experienced trauma predicted less acceptance of GCs as neighbours. Higher income positively  
33 predicted acceptance, while not having a university education predicted lower likelihood of  
34 acceptance, though university education was only predictive at  $p < .10$ . Model 3 focuses on  
35 perceptions of justice as a predictor of acceptance. Wanting GCs to receive amnesty predicts  
36 higher likelihood of acceptance, and wanting them to beg for forgiveness predicts lower  
37 acceptance. Not having a university education has the same predictive results as in Model 2, as  
38 do income and trauma experienced by a close family member. Model 4 includes the quantity  
39 and quality of contact variables. Higher quantity of contact predicts less acceptance for GCs as  
40 neighbours (but only at  $p < .10$ ). Higher quality of contact, however, predicts that indigenous  
41 Turkish Cypriots are twice as likely to be accepting of GCs. All other variables retain their  
42 previous predictive patterns, with the exception of income.  
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-----PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE-----

### *Turkish-Born Respondents*

The last predictive models are for the Turkish-born (Table 6). This subsample was not directly impacted by the events of 1974, so we do not include such variables as trauma experiences in any of the models. Even so, it is important to see what, if any, predictors differ for this sample. Model 1 includes the structural variables, but these are not significant predictors in any model. Model 2 includes the perceptions of justice variables. Two emerge as significant predictors: GCs should receive a fair trial and be harshly punished if found guilty and war criminals should pay financial compensation for their crimes. Wanting harsh punishment if found guilty in a fair trial predicts less acceptance of GCs as neighbours, while wanting financial compensation from war criminals predicts more acceptance. This pattern persists in Model 3, where we test the quantity and quality of contact variables. Quantity of contact does not significantly predict acceptance, but higher quality of contact does.

-----PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE-----

### **Discussion**

Study 1 shows GCs are more likely to accept a TC neighbour than a TS neighbour. This finding is consistent with the official master narrative of the conflict in the GC community that revolves around the Turkish invasion and occupation. Typical discourse in the media and public education includes the following comments: ‘Our problem is not with Turkish Cypriots but Turkey who violated international law by invading and occupying Cyprus until today. We used to live together with TCs and we can do it again in case of a solution as long as Turkey withdraws its troops from Cyprus’ (Dagli, 2016). Our findings also suggest that rejecting TSs whilst accepting TCs is more common among those who were 18+ in 1974. In this context,

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3 Turkish settlers are part of a larger war crime; if this war crime is to be rectified, Turkish settlers  
4  
5 have to leave Cyprus.  
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7

8         Such a set of beliefs is exacerbated by the experience of being internally displaced in  
9  
10 1974 by the invading Turkish troops, as shown in Table 2, and is supported by a legalistic  
11  
12 interpretation of the issue of settlers. In this group, a retributive sense of justice is expressed  
13  
14 by wanting to inflict harm on perpetrators – making them beg for forgiveness, withholding  
15  
16 amnesty, assigning harsh punishments or seeking compensation, not as a means to restore  
17  
18 relations with Turkish Cypriots or Turkey but as another means of inflicting a cost to the main  
19  
20 perpetrator (Turkey). They shy away from a more pragmatic, and restorative sense of justice  
21  
22 expressed in forgiveness conditioned on giving testament in a truth and reconciliation  
23  
24 committee.  
25  
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27  
28         The most consistent predictor across all four models in Study 1 is perceptions of  
29  
30 transitional justice. The more GC participants adhere to notions of retributive justice, the less  
31  
32 they are ready to live together with Turkish settlers. This finding extends to attitudes to living  
33  
34 with TCs, suggesting a troubling dimension of retributive justice views as they generalize well  
35  
36 beyond the primary image of Turks as the enemy suggesting an underlying ethnocentric view  
37  
38 of one-sided victimisation. Elite framing as it relates to official discourses, the media and  
39  
40 history teaching drives these attitudes (Kovras, 2014) while a counter-mechanism seems to be  
41  
42 in place through the positive impact of contact which offers individuals new opportunities to  
43  
44 reframe the Cyprus issue at the personal and communal level.  
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49         In terms of demographics, women are less accepting than men, and younger people are  
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51 less accepting than older people. To explain the reluctance of younger GCs to live together  
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53 with TCs, some point to the content of history and citizenship courses (Philippou and Klerides  
54  
55 2010) in public elementary and high schools. These are typically ethnocentric and often fail to  
56  
57 differentiate between Turkish Cypriots and Turks, presenting a one-sided victimization  
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3 narrative to students, emphasizing the violation of international law and human rights by  
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5 Turkey expressed through the well-known educational policy of *Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι* (“I  
6  
7 do not forget and I struggle”) and its more recent variant of *Γνωρίζω, Δεν Ξεχνώ και Διεκδικώ*  
8  
9 (“I learn about, I do not forget and I stand up for”). The findings suggest the impact of  
10  
11 transitional justice attitudes and what has been described by anthropologists as past presencing  
12  
13 (i.e. the processes that the past is present or made present). According to Orjuela (2018: 1359)  
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15 ‘the past is not a set of facts to uncover or remember, but instead something which is  
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17 continuously made sense of, lived through and acted out by individuals and collectives’ (see  
18  
19 also Macdonald:2013). Yet our findings suggest university education is likely to facilitate the  
20  
21 critical thinking of individuals and break up, at least to some extent, the one-sided historical  
22  
23 narratives embedded in the elementary and high school curriculum.  
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28  
29 The findings also imply some possible mediation mechanisms; once views about  
30  
31 transitional justice are entered in Model 3 (Table 3), the gender effects become insignificant.  
32  
33 Female IDPs are less accepting of cohabitation with TCs than male IDPs (see Sitas, Latif, and  
34  
35 Loizou 2007) because they hold higher retributive justice views, possibly because some women  
36  
37 in Cyprus might have experienced other hardships not included in our questionnaire (e.g. rape).  
38  
39 Alternatively, their lack of acceptance may be explained by the apparent absence of women  
40  
41 and women organizations from the peace process and transitional justice debates.  
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45  
46 More generally, war-related experiences, except IDP status, are unrelated to the levels  
47  
48 of acceptance of cohabitation. This may seem surprising, but it might be indicative of the role  
49  
50 of extra-individual factors and ideological apparatuses in shaping collective trauma and  
51  
52 memory of victimization rather than the personal experience of war. This is supported by the  
53  
54 fact that the only significant findings of war experiences are related to family, not self, a finding  
55  
56 suggesting that victimization which goes beyond the personal might be more important than  
57  
58 personal experience in predicting tolerance. It is also possible that the passage of time in Cyprus  
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3 has allowed individuals to developed a “post-transitional justice” understanding of the situation  
4  
5 as demonstrated for instance in the case of Spain where individuals and groups have to deal  
6  
7 with the past but decades after the traumatic events took place (Aguilar 2008; Kovras 2014).  
8  
9 Likely what matters more is the meaning attributed to a personal war-related experience and  
10  
11 adherence to the official master narrative of the conflict (Psaltis et al. 2017) or the meaning  
12  
13 given to it in a future-oriented project of reconciliation. The latter point is more apparent when  
14  
15 we focus on Greek Cypriot IDPs (Table 3). An important variable that differentiates one  
16  
17 individual from another is the intention to return and levels of intergroup contact with members  
18  
19 of the TC community. Return intentions of possible minority returnees and present levels of  
20  
21 intergroup contact with Turkish Cypriots are clearly related to the outcome; they complement  
22  
23 each other in the formulation of more acceptance of cohabitation with TCs.  
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29 Study 2 tests similar models in the Turkish Cypriot community. We find that the levels  
30  
31 of acceptance expressed by the four subcategories of voters (indigenous IDPs, indigenous non-  
32  
33 IDPs, mixed background, Turkish settlers) do not differ significantly. This suggests that the  
34  
35 Turkish settlers already granted citizenship and those of mixed background do not differ  
36  
37 significantly in their preparedness for cohabitation with Greek Cypriots, an indication that in a  
38  
39 future referendum vote they will not vote *en bloc* against the solution even if advised to do so  
40  
41 by Turkey, as often assumed by Greek Cypriots.  
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44  
45 Equally interesting is the gender effect – the reverse of that in the GC community.  
46  
47 Female TCs are more accepting of cohabitation than male TCs (Table 4), a finding unrelated  
48  
49 to views of transitional justice. Possibly, the increasing efforts by Turkey in the last decade  
50  
51 (e.g. mosques and Koran courses funded by Turkey) are threatening the secular status of  
52  
53 women in the TC community. Cohabitation with GCs could, in this context, be seen as  
54  
55 increasing the chances of maintaining the secular and liberal values of the Turkish Cypriot  
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3 community; this hypothesis as well as the related causal mechanisms outlined in the special  
4  
5 issue (Koinova and Karabegovic 2019) require further exploration.  
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8 As among the Greek Cypriots, TCs' perceptions of transitional justice are a significant  
9  
10 predictor of acceptance. Notions of retributive justice are again predictive of less acceptance,  
11  
12 with the exception of a counter-intuitive finding for the sample of Turkish settlers; those who  
13  
14 agree with the statement 'War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims'  
15  
16 are more likely to accept GCs as their neighbours. This finding is worth further exploration,  
17  
18 because there might be an ambiguity in the interpretation. For example, one might expect that  
19  
20 the natural action for war criminals is to be taken to trial, given the severity of their crimes  
21  
22 irrespective of how much time has passed, as suggested by international law. In this context,  
23  
24 settling for cash compensation instead of seeking imprisonment would be taking a lenient  
25  
26 stance and could be interpreted as facilitating reconciliation. Alternatively, it might be the case  
27  
28 that some Turkish Cypriots see reparations by Greek Cypriot war criminals in specific as a way  
29  
30 of avoiding collective blame of Greek Cypriots as is often done by nationalist circles in the  
31  
32 Turkish Cypriot community.  
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38 Quality of contact with Greek Cypriots is the more consistent and stronger finding for  
39  
40 both TC and TS communities. The finding is expected by the social psychological literature on  
41  
42 contact abroad (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) and in Cyprus (McKeown & Psaltis 2017). As  
43  
44 among Greek Cypriot IDPs, the intention of minority return increases the odds of higher levels  
45  
46 of acceptance. The findings are also suggestive of a bidirectional effect between future return  
47  
48 intentions and present intergroup contact. Possibly, those who intend to embark on minority  
49  
50 returns are preparing themselves by establishing friendships with future neighbours and  
51  
52 outgroup members more generally, but it is also possible that intergroup contact through trust  
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54 building and prejudice reduction increases acceptance and cohabitation.  
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3 For indigenous TCs (Table 5), there is an interesting finding for the indirect war-related  
4 experiences of close relatives. The lack of such experiences is predictive of less accepting  
5 attitudes, which adds support to our previous claim that beyond any personal experience what  
6 might be more important is the sense of collective victimisation.  
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12 In the final model with the subsample of voters of Turkish origin, only two transitional  
13 justice items are significant predictors of acceptance, and a trend, related to quality of contact.  
14 This time, amnesty was not a significant predictor, but the idea of perpetrators having a fair  
15 trial and, if found guilty, being harshly punished reduced accepting attitudes, as predicted.  
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## 25 **Conclusions**

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27 Our findings have potential implications for Cyprus and elsewhere. Challenging stereotypes  
28 through public education is imperative, especially as the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders  
29 have already agreed that the Turkish Cypriot constituent state will have 220,000 citizens on  
30 day one of a possible federal arrangement. This number indicates that most if not all Turkish  
31 settlers who already have voting rights will retain these in the federal state. The counter-  
32 intuitive finding that acceptance levels of Greek Cypriots by settlers and by native TCs do not  
33 differ significantly is encouraging in terms of the prospects of future cohabitation. Our  
34 observations are also matched by recent media reports in the island suggesting that “the fact  
35 that more people there are crossing north and south is a boost to the prospects of peaceful co-  
36 existence, even in the absence of a settlement.”<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, our analysis in the GC  
37 community indicates room to improve the image of Turkish settlers. Previous work has  
38 suggested that Greek Cypriots having positive contact with Turkish Cypriots have also formed  
39 more positive attitudes towards Turks from mainland Turkey (Tausch et al., 2010). Given the  
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59 <sup>3</sup> See for instance <https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/08/23/our-view-high-number-of-crossings-is-a-boost-for-co-existence/>  
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3 positive effects of contact for all groups surveyed, we suggest the need to implement additional  
4 confidence building measures, such as contact schemes, new crossing points in isolated areas  
5 of the island, school visits and dialogue workshops. Discussions among professional groups,  
6 grassroots engagements, and contact schemes could also start in schools, well before  
7 university, as our findings point to problems among those without a university education.  
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12 As suggested in Koinova and Karabegovic (2019) in this special issue, framing a new  
13 post-conflict landscape could be a critical causal mechanism in driving public attitudes and  
14 tolerance. The role of quality contact in this process cannot be overstated. The findings are in  
15 line with the meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) which shows that in various parts  
16 of the globe, intergroup contact leads to the reduction of prejudice. Contact is reducing  
17 prejudice and building trust mostly through the mediation of reduced threats (realistic and  
18 symbolic), the reduction of intergroup anxiety and the deconstruction of negative stereotypes  
19 (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) but also the promotion of empathy and perspective taking (Tropp  
20 et al, 2008). Despite the focus of our surveys on individual victimization, alternative  
21 explanations emphasising the interplay between victimization and acceptance of cohabitation  
22 have not been supported by findings while those supporting peace amnesties were more  
23 likely to demonstrate tolerance towards outgroup members. Thus the peace process in  
24 Cyprus, if successful, could use negotiated transitional justice mechanisms to facilitate  
25 peaceful coexistence (Yiakinthou 2017).  
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47 Given the central and potentially causal importance of transitional justice views on  
48 acceptance, an important element of contact and dialogue workshops could be the topic of  
49 transitional justice itself, especially the possibility of setting up a truth and reconciliation  
50 committee with a broader mandate and functioning beyond the conventional remits of  
51 restorative and retributive justice; recent TJ literature in Cyprus proposes initiatives  
52 complementing each other as alternative arrangements have their pros and cons (Yakinthou,  
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2017; Kovras 2018). Looking beyond our current surveys, a key to reconciliation involving settlers/IDPs is to identify inclusive and localized consultation mechanisms to address land conflicts through the perspectives of those affected directly. For instance, local commissions could address disputes between owners and new users and aim for amicable win-win arrangements at the individual level expanding the options available to all individuals affected by the conflict. Given our main finding that potential returnees are more accepting of TCs as neighbours than those less likely to return, new effective mechanisms incentivising return will also facilitate intergroup tolerance and its positive impact in the reunification process.

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Table 1: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Acceptance of Turkish Cypriots

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Structural Variables</i>			
Male	<b>1.564***</b> (.104)	<b>1.565***</b> (.104)	<b>1.632**</b> (.119)
Generation (Ref: Born 18+ years before 1974)			
Born after 1974	<b>.693**</b> (.139)	<b>.640**</b> (.141)	<b>.666*</b> (.168)
0-17 in 1974	.817 (.133)	.819 (.135)	.891 (.157)
No University Degree	<b>.746**</b> (.112)	<b>.748*</b> (.113)	<b>.776*</b> (.126)
Does not self-identify as IDP	.996 (.138)	.943 (.139)	.780† (.139)
<i>War Time Victimization</i>			
Did not experience personal trauma (0= experienced trauma, 1= did not experience trauma)		.989 (.264)	.881 (.324)
Family members did not experience trauma		1.046 (.107)	1.091 (.122)
<i>Perceptions of Justice</i>			
Leave injustices in the past			<b>1.583***</b> (.134)

Support Amnesty			<b>1.150**</b> <b>(.051)</b>
Beg for Forgiveness			<b>.881**</b> <b>(.040)</b>
Trial and Punishment			.993 (.053)
Criminals to Pay			.970 (.063)
Turkey to Pay			.945 (.073)
Truth & Reconciliation			<b>1.025**</b> <b>(.047)</b>
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>2.1%</b>	<b>2.1%</b>	<b>5.8%</b>
Number of Respondents	1,603	1,603	1,310

**Significance:** †p<.10, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

**Notes:** 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

2. For exact wording of questions and coding of variables, see Appendix 1.

3. In this table and all following tables, we report odds ratios and standard errors (in brackets), statistical significance of each coefficient, and overall model fit. Odds ratios less than 1 indicate that the given independent variables reduces the odds of the outcome. For example, not having a university education reduces the odds of being accepting to TCs as neighbours. Odds ratios greater than 1 means that the given independent variable increases the odds of the outcome. For example, the odds of males being more accepting of cohabitation is 1.6 times that of females.

Table 2: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Acceptance of Turkish Settlers

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Structural Variables</i>			
Male	1.067 (.158)	1.052 (.158)	.915 (.178)
Generation (Ref: born 18+ years before 1974)			
Born after 1974	1.303 (.206)	1.379 (.213)	<b>1.636†</b> <b>(.260)</b>
0-17 in 1974	.899 (.218)	.941 (.222)	1.156 (.262)
No university degree	.838 (.167)	.841 (.168)	.946 (.187)
Does not self-identify as IDP	<b>1.721*</b> <b>(.251)</b>	<b>1.711*</b> <b>(.252)</b>	<b>1.714†</b> <b>(.290)</b>
<i>War Time Victimization</i>			
Did not experience trauma		.638 (.375)	.709 (.502)
Family did not experience personal trauma		1.076 (.165)	1.125 (.186)
<i>Perceptions of Justice</i>			
Leave injustices in the past			<b>1.442†</b> <b>(.190)</b>

Support Amnesty			1.109 (.079)
Beg for Forgiveness			<b>.823**</b> <b>(.069)</b>
Trial and Punishment			.991 (.078)
Criminals to Pay			1.053 (.092)
Turkey to Pay			<b>.648***</b> <b>(.076)</b>
Truth & Reconciliation			.932 (.072)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>5.8%</b>
Number of Respondents	1,603	1,603	1,310

**Significance:** †p<.10, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

**Notes:** 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

2. For exact wording of questions and coding of variables, see Appendix 1.

**Table 3: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Acceptance of Turkish Cypriots,  
Greek Cypriot IDPs Only**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<i>Structural Variables</i>					
Male	<b>1.65**</b> (.175)	<b>1.684**</b> (.176)	1.338 (.207)	1.208 (.218)	1.259 (.235)
Generation (Ref: Born 18+ years before 1974)					
Born after 1974	.876 (.226)	.843 (.231)	.776 (.292)	.990 (.310)	.634 (.210)
0-17 in 1974	1.172 (.232)	1.172 (.234)	1.143 (.284)	1.224 (.307)	.870 (.268)
No university degree	<b>.680*</b> (.190)	<b>.682*</b> (.190)	<b>.606*</b> (.224)	<b>.592*</b> (.233)	.687 (.251)
<i>War Time Victimization</i>					
Did not personally experience trauma		1.281 (.406)	.808 (.494)	.883 (.552)	.810 (.560)
Family did not experience trauma		1.174 (.177)	1.374 (.207)	<b>1.486†</b> (.218)	<b>1.600*</b> (.237)
<i>Perceptions of Justice</i>					
Leave injustices in the past			<b>1.575†</b> (.235)	<b>1.514†</b> (.249)	1.357 (.269)

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2					
3	Support Amnesty	1.051	1.026	1.045	
4		(.099)	(.099)	(.107)	
5					
6	Beg for Forgiveness	.829	<b>.810*</b>	<b>.789**</b>	
7		(.077)	<b>(.081)</b>	<b>(.087)</b>	
8					
9					
10	Trial and Punishment	1.023	1.031	1.056	
11		(.090)	(.094)	(.103)	
12					
13	Criminals to Pay	<b>.671*</b>	<b>.657**</b>	<b>.636**</b>	
14		<b>(.125)</b>	<b>(.131)</b>	<b>(.144)</b>	
15					
16	Turkey to Pay	<b>1.371*</b>	<b>1.451*</b>	<b>1.445*</b>	
17		<b>(.145)</b>	<b>(.151)</b>	<b>(.163)</b>	
18					
19					
20	Truth &	<b>1.201*</b>	1.123	1.089	
21	Reconciliation	<b>(.085)</b>	(.090)	(.097)	
22					
23					
24					
25	<b><i>Intends to Return</i></b>		<b>1.926***</b>	<b>1.727***</b>	
26			<b>(.122)</b>	<b>(.129)</b>	
27					
28					
29					
30	<b><i>Intergroup Contact</i></b>				
31					
32	Does not have TC			1.240	
33	Friends			(.396)	
34					
35	Does not participate			.837	
36	in Bi- Communal			(.407)	
37	Activities				
38					
39					
40	Does not speak with			<b>.424**</b>	
41	TCs			<b>(.310)</b>	
42					
43	Does not have TC			.545	
44	Friends on social			(.438)	
45	media				
46					
47					
48	Family does not have			<b>.568*</b>	
49	TC friends			<b>(.284)</b>	
50					
51	<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>2.5%</b>	<b>2.7%</b>	<b>9.9%</b>	<b>16.4%</b>
52	Number of	442	595	476	462
53	Respondents				442
54					

**Significance:** †p<.10, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

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3 **Notes:** 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
4 2. For exact wording of questions and coding of variables, see Appendix 1.  
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For Peer Review Only



**Table 4. Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Acceptance of Greek Cypriots as Neighbours**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Structural Factors</i>				
Origin (Ref: Turkish Settlers)				
Indigenous TC IDP	1.448 (.244)	1.496 (.328)	1.316 (.359)	1.126 (.388)
Mixed Background	1.480 (.283)	1.508 (.288)	1.475 (.320)	1.290 (.344)
Indigenous TC Non-IDP	.730 (.266)	.699 (.236)	.794 (.264)	.705 (.287)
Gender (1=Female; 0=male)	<b>1.348†</b> <b>(.168)</b>	<b>1.367†</b> <b>(.169)</b>	<b>1.432†</b> <b>(.185)</b>	<b>1.480*</b> <b>(.197)</b>
Income	<b>1.166**</b> <b>(.052)</b>	<b>1.154**</b> <b>(.053)</b>	<b>1.119†</b> <b>(.058)</b>	1.044 (.062)
Age	<b>.987*</b> <b>(.006)</b>	.989 (.007)	.994 (.008)	1.001 (.008)
No University Education	.797 (.195)	.805 (.197)	<b>.671†</b> <b>(.217)</b>	<b>.617*</b> <b>(.234)</b>
<i>Trauma Experiences</i>				
Did not self-endure traumatic experiences		1.389 (.306)	1.107 (.331)	1.206 (.360)
Close family did not endure traumatic experiences		.885 (.214)	.873 (.230)	.894 (.242)
<i>Perceptions of Justice</i>				
Receive amnesty			<b>1.348***</b>	<b>1.253***</b>

			<b>(.059)</b>	<b>(.065)</b>
	Beg for forgiveness from victims and families		<b>.794***</b> <b>(.059)</b>	<b>.801***</b> <b>(.063)</b>
	Fair trial and, if found guilty, should be harshly punished		<b>.838**</b> <b>(.062)</b>	<b>.833**</b> <b>(.067)</b>
	War criminals should pay financial compensation		.966 (.083)	1.030 (.086)
	Foreign states to blame should pay financial compensation to victims		1.056 (.082)	1.009 (.087)
	Testify to a truth and reconciliation commission		.924 (.068)	.951 (.073)

**Contact**

Quantity of contact

**.808\***  
**(.105)**

Positive Quality of contact

**1.841\*\*\***  
**(.082)****Cox & Snell R<sup>2</sup>****5.3%****5.4%****15.7%****23.5%**

Number of Respondents

705

702

669

660

Significance: †p&lt;.10; \*p&lt;.05; \*\*p&lt;.01; \*\*\*p&lt;.001

**Table 5. Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Indigenous Turkish Cypriots' Acceptance of Greek Cypriots as Neighbours**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Structural Factors</i>				
Gender (1=Female; 0=male)	1.362 (.208)	1.327 (.212)	1.416 (.234)	1.480 (.254)
Income	<b>1.191**</b> <b>(.063)</b>	<b>1.191**</b> <b>(.064)</b>	<b>1.178*</b> <b>(.072)</b>	1.060 (.079)
Age	.994 (.007)	.994 (.008)	1.002 (.009)	1.006 (.010)
No University Education	.596* (.238)	.627† (.241)	<b>.629†</b> <b>(.271)</b>	<b>.525*</b> <b>(.297)</b>
<i>Trauma Experiences</i>				
Did not self-endure traumatic experiences		1.276 (.294)	1.268 (.329)	1.364 (.356)
Close family did not endure traumatic experiences		<b>.531**</b> <b>(.226)</b>	<b>.547**</b> <b>(.249)</b>	<b>.510**</b> <b>(.270)</b>
<i>Perceptions of Justice</i>				
Receive amnesty			<b>1.435***</b> <b>(.077)</b>	<b>1.275**</b> <b>(.087)</b>
Beg for forgiveness from victims and families			<b>.695***</b> <b>(.080)</b>	<b>.728***</b> <b>(.087)</b>
Fair trial and, if found guilty, should be harshly punished			.909 (.081)	.909 (.088)
War criminals should pay financial compensation			.818 (.107)	.916 (.117)
Foreign states to blame should pay financial compensation to victims			1.060 (.105)	.986 (.115)

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2  
3 Testify to a truth and .934 .966  
4 reconciliation commission (.087) (.097)  
5

6 **Contact**

7  
8  
9 Quantity of contact .766†  
10 (.138)  
11

12 Positive Quality of contact **2.079\*\*\***  
13 **(.155)**  
14

15  
16 **Cox & Snell R<sup>2</sup>** **4.5%** **5.9%** **19.2%** **27.8%**  
17 **Number of Respondents** 467 466 451 449

18 Significance: =not significant; †p<10; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001  
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**Table 6. Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Turkish-Born Respondents' Acceptance of Greek Cypriots as Neighbours**

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Structural Factors</i>			
Gender (1=Female; 0=male)	1.632 (.399)	2.061 (.483)	2.110 (.489)
Income	1.076 (.123)	1.073 (.140)	1.069 (.145)
Age	<b>.969†</b> <b>(.017)</b>	.966 (.022)	.974 (.023)
University Education (1=No university education; 0=University education)	1.218 (.474)	.629 (.612)	.677 (.650)
<i>Trauma Experiences</i>			
Did not self-endure experiences		-	-
Close family did not endure experiences		-	-
<i>Perceptions of Justice</i>			
Receive amnesty		1.242 (.153)	1.162 (.161)
Beg for forgiveness from victims and families		.812 (.137)	.796 (.140)
Fair trial and, if found guilty, should be harshly punished		<b>.674*</b> <b>(.155)</b>	<b>.655**</b> <b>(.160)</b>
War criminals should pay financial compensation		<b>1.483†</b> <b>(.205)</b>	<b>1.501*</b> <b>(.204)</b>

1  
2  
3 Foreign states to blame .851 .897  
4 should pay financial (.195) (.200)  
5 compensation to victims  
6

7  
8 Testify to a truth and .895 .885  
9 reconciliation commission (.172) (.175)  
10

11 **Contact**

12  
13 Quantity of contact 1.009  
14 (.269)  
15

16  
17 Positive Quality of contact **1.338†**  
18 **(.174)**  
19

20 **Cox & Snell R<sup>2</sup>** **4.1%** **20.1%** **21.9%**  
21 **Number of Respondents** **140** **126** **121**  
22

23 Significance: †p<.10; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001  
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*Supplementary Material: Appendices***Appendix I: Variables Used in Tables 1, 2, & 3**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b><i>Dependent Variables</i></b>	
Acceptance of Turkish Cypriots as neighbours (Inaccepting 0; Accepting 1)	Whether the respondent was considered accepting of having a Turkish Cypriot as neighbour
Acceptance of Turkish Settlers as neighbours (Inaccepting 0; Accepting 1)	Whether the respondent was considered accepting of having a Turkish Settler as neighbour
<b><i>Structural Factors</i></b>	
Gender (Male 0; Female 1)	Self-reported.
Generational Age (Youngest 1 Middle 2 Oldest 3)	Categorical variable created by subtracting 'Year of Birth' from the year the study was conducted.
University education (Did not attain university 1 Attained university 0)	Binary variable indicating whether respondents had completed university (defined by attainment of a BA or MA). Being older than 20 years of age was an additional criterion to account for coding error in the original survey.
<b><i>Self-identified Refugee status (for tables 1 &amp; 2 only)</i></b> (No 0; Yes 1)	Self-report.
<b><i>Trauma Experiences</i></b>	
Self-endured experience of traumatic event. (No 0; Yes 1)	Amalgamated from three binary variables asking about self-endured experience of torture, imprisonment, or physical injury. Variables were amalgamated due to low overall incidence rates in each individual traumatic experience to preserve power and remain relevant.
Close family-endured experience of traumatic event (No 0; Yes 1)	Amalgamated from four binary variables asking about close family-endured experience of imprisonment, physical injury, having a relative that went missing or been killed. Variables were amalgamated due to low overall incidence rates in each individual traumatic experience to preserve power and remain relevant.

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4 **Minority Return Intentions** 'If there is a peace settlement in 2016, how likely is it  
5 for you to return under Turkish Cypriot administration  
6 in the next 3 years?'  
7  
8 Rated as: '1=Very unlikely;' '2=Somewhat likely;'  
9 '3=Somewhat likely;' and '4=Very likely.'

10  
11 **Transitional Justice**

12  
13 Righting injustices Two-choice self-report question.  
14 ('Leave injustices in the past' 1  
15 'Right injustices of the past' 2)  
16 Receive amnesty Ordinal variable rated 1=Strongly disagree to  
17 4=Strongly agree. How do respondents feel about  
18 offering perpetrators amnesty  
19  
20 Beg for forgiveness Ordinal variable rated 1=Strongly disagree to  
21 4=Strongly agree. How do respondents feel about  
22 perpetrators begging for forgiveness as an appropriate  
23 form of justice?  
24  
25 Fair trial Ordinal variable rated 1=Strongly disagree to  
26 4=Strongly agree. How do respondents feel about  
27 perpetrators receiving a fair trial as an appropriate form  
28 of punishment but if found guilty being harshly  
29 punished?  
30  
31 War criminals pay financial Ordinal variable rated 1=Strongly disagree to  
32 compensation 4=Strongly agree. How do respondents feel about war  
33 criminals paying financial compensation as an  
34 appropriate form of punishment?  
35  
36 Turkish State pay financial Ordinal variable rated 1=Strongly disagree to  
37 compensation 4=Strongly agree. How do respondents feel about the  
38 Turkish State paying financial compensation as an  
39 appropriate form of punishment?  
40  
41 Testify to a truth and Ordinal variable rated 1=Strongly disagree to  
42 reconciliation committee in 4=Strongly agree. How do respondents feel about  
43 exchange for not being perpetrators testifying to a truth and reconciliation  
44 prosecuted commission in exchange for not being prosecuted?  
45  
46

47 **Intergroup Contact**

48  
49 Do you have Turkish Cypriot Self-report.  
50 friends?  
51 (No 0; Yes 1)  
52 Do you participate in bi- Self-report.  
53 communal activities?  
54 (No 0; Yes 1)  
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Do you have speaking contact with Turkish Cypriots? Self-report.  
(No 0; Yes 1)

Do you have Turkish Cypriot contacts on social media (e.g., Facebook)? Self-report.  
(No 0; Yes 1)

Do any members of your family have Turkish Cypriot friends? Self-report.  
(No 0; Yes 1)

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For Peer Review Only

## Appendix II: Variables Used in Tables 4, 5, 6

Variable	Description
<b><i>Dependent Variable</i></b>	
Acceptance towards Greek Cypriots as neighbours (0 = Inaccepting; 1 = Accepting)	Whether the respondent was considered to be accepting towards having a Greek Cypriot neighbour
<b><i>Structural Factors</i></b>	
Ethnic Origin (For table 4 only)	Ethnicity variable, coded from dummy coding Origin variable coded as 1 = Indigenous TC (IDP), 2 = mixed background, 3 = Indigenous TCs (Non IDPs), 4=Turkish settler. Reference category for this variable was Turkish Settlers. Original variable was self-report.
Gender (1 = Female; 0 = Male)	Self-reported.
Age	Numeric variable, self-reported in years.
Income	Interval variable. 'What is your net monthly income?' Coded as 0 = no income, and then categories ranging from 1 = up to 250 euros to 12 = More than 6000 euros.
Education (1 = Not attained university education 0 = Has attained a university education)	Binary variable. 'Has the respondent attained a university education?' Coded from ordinal 'Education' variable which ranged from 1 = can read and write to 7 = postgraduate. Coded as 'yes' if respondent indicated '6 = university' or '7= postgraduate.'
<b><i>Trauma Experiences</i></b>	
Self-endured experience of traumatic event. (0 = No; 1 = Yes)	Amalgamated from three binary variables asking about self-endured experience of intimidation, imprisonment, or physical injury. Variables were amalgamated due to low overall incidence rates in each individual traumatic experience in order to preserve power and remain relevant to the question.
Close family-endured experience of traumatic event. (0 = No; 1 = Yes)	Amalgamated from six binary variables asking about relative-endured experience of displacement, disappearance, intimidation, imprisonment, physical injury, or death. Variables were amalgamated due to low overall incidence rates in each individual

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traumatic experience in order to preserve power and remain relevant to the question.

### ***Transitional Justice***

Receive amnesty

Ordinal variable. 'They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace.' Coded as 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree.

Beg for forgiveness

Ordinal variable. 'They should beg for forgiveness from their victims and victims' families.' Coded as 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree.

Receive a fair trial and, if found guilty, should be harshly punished

Ordinal variable. 'They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished.' Coded as 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree.

War criminals should pay financial compensation

Ordinal variable. 'War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims.' Coded as 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree.

Foreign states to blame should pay financial compensation.

Ordinal variable. 'Foreign states to blame should pay financial compensation to victims.' Coded as 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree.

Testify to a truth and reconciliation committee in exchange for not being prosecuted

Ordinal variable. 'They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn't be prosecuted.' Coded as 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree.

### ***Intergroup Contact***

Quantity of contact

Continuous variable. Scale comprised by 5 items measuring contact ranging from 1=never to 7 = frequently: At work, In bi-communal meetings, In the area where you live, Occasional meetings in the north, Occasional meetings in the south. Scale 'Quantity of contact with Greek Cypriots.' Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.83$ .

Quality of contact

Continuous variable. Scale comprised by 4 items ranging from 1=totally disagree to 7=totally agree, measuring quality of contact: Pleasant, In cooperative spirit, Positive, Based on mutual respect. Scale 'Quality of contact with Greek Cypriots.' Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.90$ .

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