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**Against the current - stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right**

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## ABSTRACT

Since the 1980s, a growing number of radical right-wing populist parties have managed to establish themselves permanently in the party systems of advanced liberal capitalist democracies. Initially dismissed as ephemeral reflections of a general debasement of politics in recent years, they represent today one of the most serious challenges to liberal democracy in Western Europe and elsewhere. Unlike the traditional postwar radical right, the contemporary populist right has developed an ideology, which, albeit fundamentally anti-liberal, is compatible with the basic formal principles of democracy. Radical right-wing populist ideology is anti-elitist, appealing instead to the common sense of ordinary people; exclusionary, appealing to the right to cultural diversity and identity; and openly discriminatory, appealing to the right to “national preference.” The larger goal behind the radical right-wing populist political project is to halt and reverse the erosion of the established patterns of ethnic political and cultural dominance.

## Introduction

There are few major developments in the domestic politics of liberal capitalist democracies that have provoked as much alarm and concern in recent years as the electoral gains of right-wing parties and movements. Initially dismissed as a flash in the pan, which would die down as quickly as it had emerged, the radical right has become the arguably most formidable new political challenge to liberal democracy in Western Europe and elsewhere. And this for good reasons: As Roger Griffin has recently pointed out, unlike the “old” radical right in nineteenth and twentieth century, the contemporary radical right “enthusiastically embraces the liberal system” while, at the same time, “making a conscious effort to abide by the democratic rules of the game and respect the rights of others to hold conflicting opinions and live out contrasting value systems.”<sup>1</sup> Under the circumstances, traditional approaches to deal with the radical right – such as proscription, marginalisation and shunning (as was tried, most famously, in the case of the FPÖ by the European Union) – no longer seem to work. On the contrary. Radical right-wing parties and movements have been increasingly successful in marketing themselves as champions of “true” democracy and defenders of the values and interests of ordinary people, too often ignored if not dismissed by the political establishment. In the process, the radical right has defined the public debate on a number of important issues, ranging from immigration and citizenship to questions of security and law and order, while forcing a – not always completely -- reluctant establishment to accord these issues high priority on the political agenda.

Griffin's characterization of the contemporary radical right, echoed by a growing number of specialists on the subject, has not gone unchallenged.<sup>2</sup> The most significant attempt to defend the notion of right-wing extremism as a useful analytical tool for the analysis of contemporary right-wing parties is advanced by Piero Ignazi in his most recent book, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*.<sup>3</sup> In order to make his case, Ignazi starts out with an extensive discussion of the meaning and definition of right and left as well as extremism. He concludes that for a party to be counted among the extreme right it must either refer to "one of the established right-extremist traditions of thought" (e.g., fascism, nazism, *nouvelle droite*) or present "an anti-system discourse" (where the system is general defined as the institutions and values of liberal democracy).<sup>4</sup> Parties that disavow the former but promote the latter belong to what he refers to as the new postindustrial extreme right.

Unfortunately Ignazi, like most others who argue along the same line, fails to offer the detailed comparative analysis of radical right-wing discourse that would have been necessary to substantiate his provocative claim.<sup>5</sup> This does not mean, however, that his point is without merit. To be sure, the political project promoted and defended by the contemporary radical right is a far cry from the program advanced by the fascists and the traditional extreme right, which explicitly aimed at overturning the democratic order and replacing it with an authoritarian system. But while contemporary radical right-wing parties generally have no problem with democracy per se, they undoubtedly represent a major challenge to liberal democracy and its proponents. Even if the contemporary radical right has been able to "mobilize on political discontent without being stigmatized as anti-democrats," it still promotes an aggressive discourse that directly aims at weakening and undermining the values and institutional arrangements and procedures central to liberal democracy and replacing them with a fundamentally different system. Radical right-wing parties are thus radical both with respect to the language they employ in confronting their political opponents and the political project they promote and defend. What makes it so difficult to get a firm grip on the nature of the contemporary radical right is that it is both democratic and extreme. One of the contemporary radical right's most important innovations has been its ability to reconcile formal support for democracy as the best system for the articulation and representation of interests with a political doctrine that is profoundly anti-liberal and, in this sense, can be qualified as extremist.

In the remainder of this article we will explore the main features of the contemporary radical right's political project through an extensive analysis of its political strategy and ideological discourse. The main argument underlying this analysis is that the contemporary radical right represents a radical type of right-wing populism, whose proponents seek to transform liberal democracy into an ethnocratic regime, which gives supremacy to the interests of "the people," defined in terms of a narrow conception of citizenship. Radical right-wing populism, while adopting some of the social and economic concerns of the traditional left, accords priority to "new politics" issues, such as questions of identity and recognition.<sup>6</sup> For this reason, radical right-wing populist discourse represents a comprehensive ideology that seeks to span -- and transcend -- the modern/postmodern cleavage.

## Radical Right-Wing Populism

Populism has been defined as a „style of political rhetoric“ that seeks to mobilize ordinary people against „both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.“<sup>7</sup> One of the main features of this rhetoric is the appeal to resentment, which, as Robert C. Solomon has argued, is an emotion „that is distinguished, first of all, by its concern and involvement with power“ reflecting „a kind of blame and personal outrage, an outward projection, an overwhelming sense of injustice.“<sup>8</sup> At the same time, resentment is more than an expression of impotence, it also invokes a desire for radical change: „the world could and should be other than it is, with those at the top no longer on top, and those on the bottom no longer at the bottom.“<sup>9</sup> Populism thus lends itself ideally to a political strategy that aims at bringing about a radical transformation of the status quo. The mobilizing appeal of contemporary radical right-wing populism lies in the fact that it plays on both aspects. On the one hand it appeals to sentiments of unfairness and injustice, on the other hand it promises recourse and remedy.

Central to the contemporary radical populist right's politics of resentment is the charge that in liberal capitalist democracies power has been usurped by a self-serving political and cultural elite that pursues its own narrow agenda without concern for the legitimate concerns and interests of ordinary citizens. The result is a degeneration of representative democracy, which has ceased to function properly. Pauline Hanson was one of the first prominent radical right-wing populist leaders to characterize politicians, intellectuals and academics as a „new class“ who promoted „political correctness“ while controlling „various taxpayer `industries' that flourish in our society servicing Aborigines, multiculturalists and a host of other minority groups“ at the expense of ordinary Australians.<sup>10</sup> From the choice of examples it is quite clear that when the radical populist right refers to the „new class elite,“ it means above all what a leading New Zealand First politician has called the „spa bath, Chardonnay sipping, social [i.e., left-wing] elitists who have more interest in the fine arts than they do in working class Kiwis.“<sup>11</sup> In fact, in many instances, one of the main motivations behind radical right-wing populist mobilization has been the desire to break the „cultural hegemony“ allegedly exercised by the „68 generation“ which, as Jörg Haider and Bruno Gollnisch have put it, not only managed to gain intellectual predominance but successfully „lodged itself“ in the political system in order to pursue their subversive goals: the destruction of the nation and the family and of „all moral norms on which our civilization is founded.“<sup>12</sup> The result was the creation of a system which increasingly infringed on the right of ordinary people to speak their mind and express themselves freely without being „called names, intended to make [them] look backward, intolerant, or extremist.“<sup>13</sup> Jean-Marie has gone even further, charging that in contemporary France „we live under a totalitarian yoke with a democratic mask.“<sup>14</sup>

A brief passage from an article by the late Pim Fortuyn (with the telling title, „Extrem links“) provides an illustration of the profound resentment harbored by the radical populist right against the left-wing elite.

The extreme left -- the Greens and the PvdA (Social Democrats) plus their henchmen in the civil service and the media -- have tried to suppress, via the subsidized thought police and the increased number of anti-racist committees, all critique of the blessings of multicultural society. And woe to those critics who failed to express themselves in a legally careful fashion; they were quickly brought to court by the public prosecutor. Ever heard of a Moroccan or Iranian brought to trial for blatant anti-semitic remarks, or of a Muslim who calls our women whores and us, Christian dogs?<sup>15</sup>

Similar vitriolic charges have been advanced by a number of other leading figures on the radical populist right, accusing their opponents and detractors of picking on ordinary people with “hypocritical self-righteousness” while ignoring the real problems.<sup>16</sup> As Christoph Blocher put it in a speech (in which he sought to defend Switzerland’s behaviour during the Second World War against critics urging the Swiss to confront their country’s shortcomings in dealing with Nazi Germany): “In bigoted, loud-mouthed, hypocritical manifestos, these people extol their own highly sensitive sense of humanity, their flawless character, their deep concern, and they quickly point a finger at the guilt-laden decision makers. ‘We are the good guys, we are disassociating ourselves from the bad guys, and we are proclaiming it in full-page advertisements.’”<sup>17</sup> As Blocher made clear, the question of the past was hardly the only case where the “moralists” and “*Gutmenschen*” (good guys) tried to impose their view of the world and their standards of political correctness on a reticent, but powerless majority. The same was true for questions regarding European integration, the abuse of the right to asylum, and particularly integration and multiculturalism.

Given these charges, it is hardly surprising that the radical populist right has generally promoted itself as the only relevant political force that dares to make a stand against, challenge and resist the prevailing ideas by saying uncomfortable truths.<sup>18</sup> But the radical populist right not only claims for itself to say out loud what the majority of the population secretly thinks (one of the main Vlaams Blok slogans has been “*zeggen wat u denkt*” [say what you think]), but, as Jean-Marie Le Pen has famously put it, also “to return the word to the people” (*render la parole au people*.)” Characteristically, radical right-wing populist leaders have generally been rather careful in cultivating an image of the outsider and political maverick, who consciously ignores and flouts conventions.<sup>19</sup> One of the best examples of this strategy was Pauline Hanson’s emphasis on the fact that she was not a “polished politician” but an ordinary woman whose view on issues was “based on common sense and my experience as a mother of four children, a sole parent and a businesswoman running a fish and chip shop.” Similarly, Pia Kjaersgaard has insisted that she could not care less “what the political establishment says and thinks. What is important to me is that the local storekeeper agrees.”<sup>20</sup> Finally, Winston Peters has gone on record stating that he and his party trusted the “commonsense of ordinary people” far more than the “cultural commissars and ethnic engineers” in the governing Labour Party, who sought “to transform New Zealand into a politically correct, gender bent, lawless, Third World republic.”<sup>21</sup>

The appeal to “the common sense of the ordinary people” as a basis of legitimization for political claims and demands is a crucial element in contemporary radical right-wing rhetoric and central to its fundamental critique of representative democracy.<sup>22</sup> The core contention behind this critique is that in modern liberal democracies, representative democracy has become little more than a farce, a simulacrum carefully cultivated by the elite to delude ordinary voters into believing that their vote counts for something. In reality, as Winston Peters put it in a recent speech,

Our form of democratic process really only consists of placing ticks in boxes every three years. We have the right of free speech but we know, sadly, that most of the time that no one is listening. The politicians peddle their own agenda, or that of their bureaucrats, and most people are left muttering to themselves or complaining to talkback radio. You see the democratic process that we take part in actually leads to a tyranny and we believe this is happening in New Zealand. (...)

The perversion of the democratic process has been perpetuated by the media, which has never learned to accept that New Zealanders voted out the old two party system. The media are obsessed with creating coalitions among political parties and find it hard to accept that democracy should be more than setting up cliques of political power. (...) As a result, politicians do as they wish. Instead of placing the interests of the people first, they put their parties first or pander to some self interest group in return for prejudice, cash or votes or all three. Is it any wonder that ordinary New Zealanders feel powerless because they have no say in deciding the momentous issues facing their society?<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, the appeal to the common sense of ordinary people holds a prominent place in radical right-wing populist ideology. On the one hand it allows the radical populist right to counter charges of racism and right-wing extremism. As the program of the Vlaams Blok has put it: “Our party program and our position on foreigners have nothing to do with extremism or racism, but everything with healthy common sense (*gewoon gezond verstand*).”<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, it lends legitimacy to and garners support for the radical right’s call for far-reaching political change designed to give voice to ordinary citizens excluded from the political process by the machinations of the established political parties and the dominant elite.<sup>25</sup> It is therefore not surprising that radical right-wing political parties have generally made the promotion of direct democracy one of their main political priorities. Demands include, among other things, the call for the introduction of binding initiatives and referenda, the reduction in the size of parliament and the cabinet, and the direct election of executive positions. This, as Winston Peters has put it in classic populist style, would give ordinary people the opportunity to “create a democracy that is of the people and for the people.” In

fact, in a situation where “ordinary New Zealanders feel powerless” because politicians, instead “of placing the interests of the people first, they put their parties first or pander to some self interest group,” the people had a “moral duty to rise up and restore democracy themselves.”<sup>26</sup> With this line of argument, the radical populist right not only promotes itself as the advocate of the rights and interests of ordinary citizens, but as the defender of “true” and “genuine” democracy while at the same time justifying a political project that has as its goal a far-reaching transformation of the prevailing system.<sup>27</sup>

## Identitarian Politics

In his book, *Baas in eigen land*, Filip Dewinter advances the provocative thesis that with the end of the cold war the old left-right conflict has become largely obsolete, to be replaced by a new social and political cleavage (*breuklijn*) that pits identity against multiculturalism.<sup>28</sup> Dewinter’s thesis reflects one of the most important developments in the evolution of radical right-wing populist ideology – a growing emphasis on questions of culture, values and identity and, with it, the recourse to claims of recognition. In recent years, the radical populist right has aggressively promoted itself as the defender of diversity and particularity against those promoting universalism and “deracination.” Strategically, appeals to the “right” to identity and respect for “difference” and cultural distinctiveness have served as one more device to meet the charge of racism and extremism. As Filip Dewinter has succinctly put it, “racism means a belief that on the basis of racial features a group of people is superior or inferior to another. This isn’t what we believe; everyone is equal but not all the same.”<sup>29</sup>

One of the central features of contemporary radical right-populist discourse is its attempt to delineate who ‘the people’ are and who does and should not legitimately be part of the people – for example, groups representing racial and ethnic minorities who will not ‘assimilate’ into the desired culture. This involves both an argument that the elites and political leadership have not been listening to the (legitimate) “people” and an attempt to ensure that they stop listening to groups and organizations that in the radical populist right’s view are not legitimate. In short, the apparent arguments for “genuine” democracy are actually arguments for excluding some groups from democratic representation. At the same time, they are ideological arguments for influencing whose identity should be politically recognised and whose should not.

The ideological justification for exclusion in the name of the preservation of identity advanced by radical right-wing populists derives its logic from what Pierre-André Taguieff has provocatively characterized as “differentialist racism.” Unlike traditional forms of racism, differentialist racism “is communitarian and turns the difference or identity of a group into an absolute. Here it is less a question of inequality than of the inability to communicate, of being incommensurable or incompatible.” Differentialist racism is “imbued with the categorical imperative of

preserving the identity of the group, whose very 'purity' makes it sacred – the identity of heredities and heritages.” As a result, “exclusion is given a place of honor in the general demand of the right to difference.”<sup>30</sup>

As Taguieff notes, the identitarian positions defended by the contemporary radical populist right are largely founded on this ideology. The strongest support for this claim comes, surprisingly enough, from the Lega Nord, which scholars have more often than not been rather reluctant to include among radical right-wing populist parties. However, it has been the Lega Nord, which has made most explicit reference to concepts and figures of speech directly derived from the differentialist discourse.<sup>31</sup> Thus in a document from late 2002, designed to explain the party's reasons for insisting on a new immigration law, the Lega Nord affirmed, among other things, its “differentialist vision of the world.” And it continued: “Those who fight for the survival of their nations represent the camp of the diversity of cultures, true tolerance, and freedom whereas the America-like multiculturalism (*multiculturalismo americanomorfo*) represents the camp of uniformity, deracination, and enslavement.”<sup>32</sup> Umberto Bossi had set the tone for the party's campaign for the defense of “Padanian” identity as early as 2000 when, during his speech at the Lega Nord's traditional meeting in Pontida, he maintained:

We who fight for the diversity of the peoples (*popoli*), starting from our own peoples, and their right to freedom, we fight against this new project: the absolutism of racism, which today is based, I repeat, not on direct violence, but on the indirect violence of the negation of any difference.<sup>33</sup>

The appeal to the defense of diversity and difference, however, not only serves to reverse charges of racism; it also serves to justify – in the name of what Bruno Gollnisch has called “the desire of the nations to preserve their identity” -- concrete policies of exclusion.<sup>34</sup> Thus in a recent speech Marine Le Pen, accusing her party's detractors of “intellectual terrorism” for using the “myth of exclusion” as a justification to promote minorities while equating exclusion with discrimination and ultimately racism, defiantly maintained: “Yet every social life is founded on affiliations that legitimately determine inclusion and, on the contrary, exclusion. Religion, nation, family, enterprise, association: they all represent communities of members, which legitimately exclude those who are not members, without causing them injustice or violence. It is therefore undisputable that France has the duty to control who enters and to regulate the inflows according to her possibilities and capacity to receive them.”<sup>35</sup> Winston Peters has argued along similar lines when he compared his party's position on immigration with the Great Wall of China, which, after all, “was built to keep people out.” Immigration policy should be designed in a similar fashion, “for inclusion as well as exclusion.” He and his party were “committed to both in order to successfully manage our borders and protect the nation's interest.”<sup>36</sup>

This suggests that radical right-wing populist identity politics serves primarily as an ideological justification for selective exclusion. The main argument behind this is that certain groups cannot be integrated into society and therefore represent a fundamental



threat to the values, way of life, and cultural integrity of the “indigenous” people (where “indigenous” people are invariably defined as those people who share the dominant, i.e., “western,” and largely European values and culture). Unchecked immigration must inevitably provoke what Winston Peters and other radical right-wing populists have called a “collision of cultures” and ultimately lead to the transformation of the developed world into “third world” countries.<sup>37</sup> It would, however be quite misleading to characterize radical right-wing populist parties as “anti-immigrant” or “anti-immigration parties” *tout court*. To be sure, in recent years, one of the most distinct features of radical right-wing populist parties has been their pronounced opposition to immigration. However, the radical populist right’s position on the “foreigner question” has been far more complex and ambiguous than most analysts have been prepared to concede.

In Australia and New Zealand, for example, the radical populist right’s campaign against immigration has targeted above all migrants from Asia. Thus Pauline Hanson argued against increasing levels of Asian immigration, claiming that Australia risked having an Asian-dominated population. She claimed that the problem with Asians was precisely that they didn’t assimilate unlike previous migrant groups (whose “whiteness” was implicit). Overall, Hanson argued against multiculturalism, claiming that Australia, rather than promoting multicultural “separatism,” should return to its old policies of assimilationism into core values. It was wrong that migrants were keeping their old countries’ values rather than becoming “Australian.” Indeed, the idea behind One Nation was precisely the argument that Australia should have one set of (traditional Anglo) core values to which all Australians should adhere. In the process, Hanson, like Dewinter and other leading radical right-wing populists, repeatedly denied being racist, implying that racism involved a conception that people were biologically inferior whereas she didn’t mind which race people were as long as they assimilated into mainstream Australian values (which many Asians wouldn’t do).<sup>38</sup> In a similar way, Winston Peters, who is of both Maori and Scots descent, has argued that unchecked immigration, particularly from Asia, was causing a divided, fragmented society and a decline in common values. The emphasis should be on integration and assimilation rather than the “politically correct” concept of diversity since “this fetish with diversity is destroying our national identity” and ultimately leads to the “Balkanisation of our country.” While expressing his commitment to the idea that “all New Zealanders are equal,” Peters also maintained that “New Zealand’s identity, culture and traditions are of value and we say it is reasonable to expect those who settle here to accept them. (...) If you don’t like the way we are you are welcome to enjoy another one of our great freedoms – the freedom to go back home.”<sup>39</sup>

Ironically enough, by aggressively standing up for western culture and values, the radical populist right has managed to promote itself as uncompromising defenders of the liberal heritage. This has been particularly pronounced with respect to Islam, which in recent year has come to occupy a prominent place in the radical populist right’s identitarian

discourse. The late Pim Fortuyn was hardly the first to warn of the “Islamization of our culture” as the most serious threat to the survival of western open societies. Jörg Haider and Umberto Bossi had maintained as much already in the early 1990s when they charged Islam as being fundamentally incompatible with the core values defended by western societies, such as democracy and human rights, individualism and religious freedom, and particularly women’s rights.<sup>40</sup> Even before September 11, the radical populist increasingly adopted this line of argument to support and legitimize its politics of exclusion. The Danish People’s Party, for example, made the fight against what it characterized as the subversion of Danish society by militant Muslims the central theme for its election campaign in 2001. Charging that Islam was not a religion but a “political program” that promoted “medieval practices,” the party charged that the “Muslim way of life” was fundamentally incompatible with liberal democracy.<sup>41</sup> In Belgium Filip Dewinter went even further, characterizing Islam as a “totalitarian ideology” that while despising and denigrating “our norms, values and way of life” was intent on “colonizing Europe” and subjugating it to its will.<sup>42</sup> Referring to Samuel P. Huntington, Dewinter and others on the radical populist right argued that faced with a major “clash of civilizations” western societies would only survive if they united to defend their distinctiveness and identity.<sup>43</sup> Confronted with a rapidly growing immigrant community from Muslim countries that aggressively challenged the customs, practices and way of life of their host societies (by, for example, campaigning for the removal of crucifixes from schools and other public spaces), intended, as the Lega Nord put it, to bring about “the definitive annulment of an identity,” western societies had no other choice than to stand up and fight for their survival.<sup>44</sup> For what is at stake is nothing less than the “foundations of our western civilization.”<sup>45</sup>

The radical populist right’s position on Islam provides a striking illustration of the logic behind its politics of exclusion. With a growing number of these parties seeking to gain legitimacy by moderating their rhetoric and their demands, the radical populist right no longer calls for the complete reversal of all aspects of immigration policy. The new position is one that gives immigrants a choice – assimilation or return.<sup>46</sup> From the radical populist right’s point of view, assimilation is more than integration. It means “complete absorption” in a process, which Rogers Brubaker has characterized as “organic assimilation.”<sup>47</sup> This presupposes not only a willingness on the part of immigrants to adopt the host society’s norms, culture and way of life, but also a predisposition on their part that allows them to do that, thus cultural commensurability. In the case of Muslims, the radical populist right denies that this commensurability exists. A programmatic article, published in the Lega Nord daily newspaper, *La Padania*, makes that clear when it refers to the Islam’s irreducible “incompatibility with regard to European culture” and “Western values,” which makes Islam fundamentally impervious to integration.<sup>48</sup> Islam, as the Vlaams Blok has blatantly stated, is “fundamentally un-European,” intrinsically intolerant of, and hostile to, the core values that constitute the heritage of western civilization, and, in the final analysis, a deadly threat to its survival.<sup>49</sup> In the eyes of the

radical populist right, the exclusion of Western Europe's growing Muslim minority together with measures designed to prevent further inflow of migrants from Muslim countries thus represents an act of self-defense rather than an act of discrimination. As Filip Dewinter once put it, those who "in this country, those who appeal to Islam have in fact already signed their return ticket to their country of origin."<sup>50</sup>

From this perspective, the radical populist right's hostility toward multiculturalism makes perfect sense. As a prominent SVP politician has put it, multiculturalism is nothing more than a "resigned reaction" to the fact that the vast majority of recent immigrants are unwilling to assimilate and "instead insist that their national and cultural identity be respected." Given the incommensurability of cultures like Islam with western values, the "multicultural experiment" not only endangers "fundamental western values," but threatens to destroy the local culture.<sup>51</sup> Faced with this danger, the radical populist right sees and promotes itself as the only relevant force intent on and capable of defending "the sacrosanct right of our people to maintain and defend their own ethno-cultural and religious identity and not to get reduced to the status of a residual minority in their own country."<sup>52</sup> Again, from the radical populist right's point of view, this line of argument should not be construed as an expression of ethnocentrism or even worse, racism, but as a logical consequence of the right to cultural recognition, which should be conferred equally to all cultures. This, however, is a fundamentally anti-liberal position. For, as Kevin McDonough has pointed out, a "liberal society dedicated to the value of equal respect must also recognize the multiplicity of cultural sub-groups that constitute it."<sup>53</sup> This is a proposition the radical populist right rejects as a matter of principle, arguing that the call for the recognition of cultural diversity is nothing more than an ideological construct promoted by the "multicultural industry" designed to legitimize extending unjustified privileges to minorities at the expense of everybody else.

### The Ethnocratic Alternative

The radical populist right's political project aims at putting an end to multicultural experiments and at reestablishing the principles of ethnocratic rights.<sup>54</sup> Ethnocracy represents a system, which, on the basis of "qualified rights to citizenship, and with ethnic affiliation (defined in terms of race, descent, religion, or language) as the distinguishing principle" seeks, via the mobilization of "historical claims and cultural symbols steeped in mythology over distant and not so-distant past" to "secure that most important instruments of state power are controlled by a specific ethnic collectivity."<sup>55</sup> As Andreas Wimmer has shown, ethnocratic principles have been a constitutive element in the formation of the modern nation state; "political closure along national lines" the "price" to be paid for the creation of modern communities guaranteeing solidarity, justice and democracy. In the process, access "to state power and unlimited access to services of the new bureaucracy were restricted to those who could show themselves to be part of the national community, because the only legitimate form of government had become the rule of like over like."<sup>56</sup>

In the radical populist right's view, recent socioeconomic and sociocultural developments associated particularly with internationalization and globalization fundamentally challenge and threaten to undermine the principles and institutional arrangements that have guaranteed what Wimmer calls "ethno-national dominance." This, however, is only part of the problem. More important, from the radical populist right's perspective, is the fact that the elite has largely adopted a "mondialist" worldview that aggressively promotes, as Umberto Bossi has put it, "the negation of any kind of difference."<sup>57</sup> For Jean-Marie Le Pen, this new mondialist ideology (*mondialisme*) aims at nothing less than the establishment of a "new global order" based on the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and, with it, the establishment of "a totalitarian democracy" on the "ruins" of the nations and their "liberties, traditions, and particularisms."<sup>58</sup> In the Lega Nord's view, *mondialismo* is based on a utopian – and fundamentally racist -- ideology that sees humanity inevitably destined for the "mixing of cultures" along the lines of the American model of the melting pot. At the same time, it is based on the notion that society is nothing more than an assemblage of "residents who at a certain point of time live in a certain space and whose only real social ties consist of those that the various occupants of this territory happen to establish among each other." Mondialismo thus not only fundamentally negates the importance of culture and heritage, but also the notion that society's wealth is largely the result of the hard "work and the struggles" of earlier generations, which, in turn gives certain privileged rights to their descendants.<sup>59</sup> In the Lega Nord's view, this mondialist ideology was a new racism, aimed at the complete eradication of diversity, identity, and cultural idiosyncrasy as a first step toward the construction of a totalitarian, monocultural global village.<sup>60</sup>

From the perspective of the radical populist right, the promotion of pluralistic models of society and what Andreas Wimmer has referred to as a "deterritorialized, transnational regime of citizenship rights"<sup>61</sup> by supra-national institutions and non-governmental organizations in Europe and elsewhere represents nothing less than a "plot (*complot*) intent on destroying the nations and the frame of the natural order" and with it, any sense of belongingness and identity.<sup>62</sup> This is one of the reasons why in Western Europe, the radical populist right has generally been hostile to the institutionalized process of European integration in form of the European Union. The FPÖ, for example, argued in 1994, Austrian membership in the EU would lead to a "far-reaching loss of [Austria's] national sovereignty." An inevitable transfer of a great deal of decision-making power from the national and provincial parliaments to the European Commission would severely restrict popular sovereignty and undermine direct democracy.<sup>63</sup> In Switzerland, the SVP went even further, characterizing the proponents of EU membership as unpatriotic and "tired of the fatherland" and intent on selling out Switzerland's neutrality, independence, and popular rights.<sup>64</sup> Christoph Blocher, in a programmatic speech from 2001, characterized the EU as an "undemocratic big power," which used threats and blackmail to impose its will on small countries like Switzerland.<sup>65</sup> Despite this reality, the majority of Switzerland's political elite continued to pursue EU membership and thus

to surrender more and more of the country's freedom, sovereignty and democratic self-determination, particularly with respect to the protection of her borders and "the independent regulation of immigration and naturalization."<sup>66</sup>

The main political goal of radical right-wing populist politics is to bring about a reversal of these trends via a political project that accords absolute priority to the interests and concerns of the popular sovereign. The aim of what Jean-Marie Le Pen has called the "national alternative" is the reestablishment of the supremacy of national law over supranational laws, treaties, and directives. In its most radical form, it aims at the reestablishment of a strict policy of "national preference" with respect to citizenship, social rights and access to work according to the principle, "the own people first," which in one form or another has been adopted by virtually all radical right-wing populist parties as their trademark. For the right populist right, the establishment of a policy of national preference represents a crucial step towards once again becoming "boss in the own country" (according to a well-known Vlaams Blok slogan).<sup>67</sup> Ideologically, the call for national preference derives its logic and justification above all from arguments that blame current problems of the welfare state directly on immigration and thus appeal both to the "common sense" of ordinary people and their resentments toward newcomers. A typical example of this strategy is a passage from a speech by a leading member of New Zealand first, which castigates the current Labour government's "open door" approach to immigration as a policy,

Where refugees and asylum seekers and suspected terrorists who have lied and deceived their way into our country on false documents and concocted stories, enjoy hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars of legal assistance, housing and care whilst thousands of New Zealanders can't get a state home and thousands more are being cut from the waiting lists not with a scalpel, but with a pen. Tens of thousands of supposed business category immigrants arrive here to make our lives so much better only to end up on the social welfare pig's back, because they had hoodwinked a naive Immigration Minister who truly believes that no prospective immigrant would ever lie to an immigration official!<sup>68</sup>

From the radical populist right's point of view, in a situation, where "honest and hardworking" ordinary people are increasingly "becoming the idiots of the nation," national preference is an attempt to safeguard the social gains of the past, in other words, a legitimate defense of the welfare of the "own people."<sup>69</sup> This, as Jean-Marie Le Pen claims, has nothing to do with racism. On the contrary, to speak of national preference "means to show solidarity with the national community. It is legitimate to protect one's community before looking after the condition of other communities, even if one has to remain attentive to the plight of the others."<sup>70</sup>

Conclusion

Contemporary radical right-wing populist parties have often been described as opportunistic political agents, whose political programs reflect little more than the latest trends in public opinion. In this article we have tried to argue that this is only half of the picture. Much of the rant of prominent radical right-wing populist leaders is inspired by a distinct ideology, which has shaped and formed its political project. Like all ideologies, radical right-wing populist ideology proposes an analysis designed to respond to a number of essential political questions: what went wrong; who is to blame; and what is to be done to reverse the situation. As we have seen, radical right-wing populist discourse provides an answer to each of these questions. Reduced to its core, radical right-wing populist ideology is a response to the erosion of the system of “ethno-national dominance,” which characterized much of the history of modern nation states.

As Andreas Wimmer and others have argued, exclusion and “national preference” have hardly been alien to liberal western democracies. In fact, particularly with the emergence of the welfare state, they became central to the maintenance of social consensus. It is thus hardly surprising that even those favoring ethnocultural diversity and policies promoting multiculturalism have warned of the potentially negative consequences of these developments for the welfare state.<sup>71</sup> Radical right-wing populist ideology emphatically maintains that this has already happened, blaming the political and cultural elite for undermining and destroying the established system of privilege and exclusion, based on closely circumscribed citizen rights. The strategic goal is to reverse this development and reinstall ethno-national dominance. Like the French *nouvelle droite*, the contemporary radical populist right sees political struggle primarily in terms of a “metapolitical” contestation of the power to define concepts and shape discourse. From this perspective, radical right-wing populist ideology can be characterized as a postmodern ideology, largely inspired by the notion that in modern, media-saturated societies textual representations represent a, if not the, major site of struggle.

Unlike fascist and right-wing extremist parties and movements of the past, the contemporary radical populist right hardly seeks to bring about a revolutionary transformation of the existing democratic regime and the creation of a “new man.” On the contrary, a central element of radical right-wing populist parties’ political strategy has been to point out the gaps and contradictions between the abstract principles and claims informing representative democracy and their application in the real world. As Bruno Villalba has recently argued with regard to the French case, those studying the radical populist right have not always sufficiently appreciated this “underground work” of radical right-wing populist ideology, which goes beyond a radical critique of “those aspects of the representative principle, which are most contentious (such as the practices associated with the functioning of parties: financing, clientilism, etc.),” sowing doubts and suspicions with respect to the whole representative system as a first step towards replacing it with a system

responsive to the popular desire for genuine political involvement and participation.<sup>72</sup>

Despite its revolutionary pretensions (one of Umberto Bossi's books had the provocative title, *La rivoluzione*) and postmodern aspirations, radical right-wing populist ideology is a backward-looking reactionary ideology, reflecting a deep sense of nostalgia for the good old days. Although fundamentally anti-liberal in its rejection of the possibility of universal rights and the negation of the possibility of ethnically diverse communities living peacefully side by side in the same society, radical right-wing populist ideology is only borderline extremist (at least with regard to the way extremism has been defined in the academic literature). One of the most curious aspects of the ideology is its ability to combine seemingly contradictory notions into a new ideological amalgam, the most striking example being the appeal to the defense of western liberal values to bolster the call for exclusion based on essentialist claims (e.g., Islam is by nature anti-western). Roger Griffin has tried to capture this tension by suggesting to characterize the core of radical right-wing populist ideology in terms of "ethnocratic liberalism."<sup>73</sup> In fact, it might even be characterized as a radicalized version of what, after all, have been mainstream concerns and practices (and thus might perhaps be characterized as a genuine radicalization of the center) for most of the twentieth century,<sup>74</sup> extremist only by virtue of the strident and shrill tone of radical right-wing populist discourse and its uncompromising position. From this perspective, it seems hardly surprising that center-right parties have had relatively few problems in entering in coalitions with radical right-wing populist parties or raising similar issues in somewhat more subtle forms.<sup>75</sup>

From this perspective, radical right-wing populist ideology represents above all one position in a larger, current "political struggle about who deserves to be cared for by state and society: a fight for the collective goods of the state."<sup>76</sup> This might at least in part explain why in recent years, a number of radical right-wing populist parties (most prominently the Front national, the FPÖ, and the Scandinavian radical populist right) have been increasingly successful in appealing to those social groups that have felt most threatened both by the loss of their relatively privileged social position (e.g., skilled unionized blue-collar workers from the dominant ethnic group) and by the neglect of those political parties that once defended their interests and espoused their cause.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> R. Griffin, 'Interregnum or Endgame? Radical Right Thought in the "Post-Fascist" Era', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5/2 (2000), p. 173; R. Griffin, 'Afterword: Last Rites?' in S. P. Ramet (Ed.), *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), p. 298.

<sup>2</sup> Similar views have been expressed by J.-Y. Camus, 'Fascism Isn't What It Used to Be', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English version, March 2000; R. Eatwell, 'The New Extreme Right Challenge', in R. Eatwell and C. Mudde (Eds.), *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 5-14; and J. Rydgren, 'Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family', *European Journal of Political Research*, forthcoming.

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- <sup>3</sup> P. Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- <sup>4</sup> Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, p. 27.
- <sup>5</sup> Notable exceptions are C. Mudde, *The Ideology of the Extreme Right* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) and M. Swyngedouw and G. Ivaldi, 'The Extreme-Right Utopia in Belgium and France: The Ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National', *West European Politics*, 24/3 (2001), pp. 1-22.
- <sup>6</sup> See H.-G. Betz, 'Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe', in L. Panitch and C. Leys (Eds.), *Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism*, Socialist Register 2003 (London: Merlin Press, 2002), pp. 193-210.
- <sup>7</sup> M. Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 3; M. Canovan, 'Trust the People! The Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy', *Political Studies*, 47/1 (1999), p. 3.
- <sup>8</sup> R. C. Salomon, 'One Hundred Years of Ressentiment: Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*', in R. Schacht (Ed.), *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 103.
- <sup>9</sup> Salomon, *ibid.*, p. 119.
- <sup>10</sup> P. Hanson, 'Australia, Wake Up!' Pauline Hanson's Maiden Speech, September 10., 1996 at <http://nsw.onenation.net.au/policy/misc/phmaiden.htm>.
- <sup>11</sup> R. Mark, speech to the New Zealand First 2003 Convention, November 11, 2003, Christchurch at [http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display\\_item.php?t=1&i=1195](http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display_item.php?t=1&i=1195).
- <sup>12</sup> J. Haider, *Die Freiheit, die ich meine* (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1993), p. 74; B. Gollnisch, 'Mai 68: revolution ratée?' *Le Figaro*, May 25, 1998.
- <sup>13</sup> P. Hanson, 'Party Launch Speech,' April 11, 1997 at <http://www.onenation.net.au/archives/partylaunch.php>.
- <sup>14</sup> J.-M. Le Pen, 'Libérons la France!' Introduction to *Programme du Front national* at <http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/programme.pdf>.
- <sup>15</sup> P. Fortuyn, 'Extrem links,' March 26, 2002 at <http://www.pim-fortuyn.nl/columns/column.asp?ID=83>.
- <sup>16</sup> See, for example, M. Hastings, 'Front national: des mots pour faire mal,' *Le Monde*, November 25, 1996.
- <sup>17</sup> C. Blocher, 'Switzerland and the Second World War: A Clarification,' Zurich-Oerlikon, March 1, 1997, p. 10 at <http://www.blocher.ch/en/artikel/970301worldwar2.pdf>.
- <sup>18</sup> In fact, in a recent speech, Filip Dewinter characterized "resistance" against, among other things, political correctness, immigration and the permissive society as the essence of the Vlaams Blok's political *raison d'être*. See F. Dewinter, speech delivered at the 3<sup>rd</sup> national convention, Ghent, October 6, 2002 at [http://www.vlaamsblok.be/activiteiten\\_manifestaties\\_conventie\\_toespraak\\_fdw.shtml](http://www.vlaamsblok.be/activiteiten_manifestaties_conventie_toespraak_fdw.shtml).
- <sup>19</sup> See, for example, M. Tarchi, *L'Italia populista* (Bologna: Il Mulino), 2003, pp. 135-136.
- <sup>20</sup> P. Hanson, 'Australia, Wake Up!' *op. cit.*, Ref. 10; Pia Kjærsgaard made the statement to *Berlingske Tidende*, October 4, 1997, quoted in P. Hervik, 'Limits of Tolerance and Limited Tolerance: How Tolerant are the Danes?' Copenhagen, The Board for Ethnic Equality, December 9, 2001 at [www.evensfoundation.be/Commonlang/Hervik%20.pdf](http://www.evensfoundation.be/Commonlang/Hervik%20.pdf).
- <sup>21</sup> W. Peters, 'Labour Fears Direct Democracy,' New Zealand First press release, November 13, 2003 at <http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/PA0311/S00293.htm>.
- <sup>22</sup> The appeal to the common sense of the common people was a cornerstone of Preston Manning's Reform Party of Canada in the early 1990s. See S. Patten, 'Preston Manning's Populism: Constructing the Common Sense of the Common People,' *Studies in Political Economy*, 50 (Summer 1996), pp. 95-132.
- <sup>23</sup> W. Peters, 'Replacing Political Tyranny with Direct Democracy,' Wellington, November 12, 2003 at [http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display\\_item.php?t=1&i=1245](http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display_item.php?t=1&i=1245).
- <sup>24</sup> Vlaams Blok, *Een toekomst voor Vlaanderen – Programma en standpunten van het Vlaams Blok* (Brussels: Vlaams Blok, 2002), p. 19.
- <sup>25</sup> See, for example, M. Goot and I. Watson, 'One Nation's Electoral Support: Where Does It Come From, What Makes It Different and How Does It Fit?' *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 47/2 (2001), pp. 159-191. They argue that support for One Nation in the late 1990s was driven primarily by opposition to elite values, particularly around questions of race.
- <sup>26</sup> W. Peters, 'Replacing Political Tyranny with Direct Democracy,' *op. cit.*, Ref. 23.
- <sup>27</sup> Thus the FPÖ quite explicitly characterized itself in the early 1990s as the only force that "pursues a strategy of system change." FPÖ, 'Freiheitliche Thesen zur politischen Erneuerung Österreichs,' Vienna: Freiheitliches Bildungswerk, 1994, p. 4.



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- <sup>28</sup> F. Dewinter, *Baas en eigen land* (Brussels: Uitgeverij Egmont, 2000), p. 14.
- <sup>29</sup> Dewinter in an interview for a BBC 2 program entitled "Our Nationality," May 13, 2001.
- <sup>30</sup> P.-A. Taguieff, 'From Race to Culture: The New Right's View of European Identity', *Telos*, 98-99 (1993-1994), pp. 122, 124.
- <sup>31</sup> For a first attempt to come to grips with this issue see A. Spektorowski, 'Ethnoregionalism: The Intellectual New Right and the Lega Nord', *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 2/ 3 (2003), pp. 55-70.
- <sup>32</sup> Lega Nord, 'Ragionare sull'immigrazione: la nuova legge Bossi,' Lega Nord, Secretaria Politica Federale, Milan, September 2002, p. 21.
- <sup>33</sup> Intervento del Secretario Federale, On. Umberto Bossi, Pontida, June 4, 2000.
- <sup>34</sup> B. Gollnisch, 'Droits de l'homme, racisme, xénophobie et antisémitisme', March 15, 2000 at [http://www.gollnisch.com/discours\\_detail.php?id\\_inter=72](http://www.gollnisch.com/discours_detail.php?id_inter=72)
- <sup>35</sup> M. Le Pen, 'Discours prononcé lors de l'université d'été du FN à Annecy', August 29, 2002 at <http://www.generationslepen.com/discoursannecy.html>.
- <sup>36</sup> W. Peters, 'One Country, One Nation, One People', address to Chinese Communities and Associations, Auckland, July 14, 2002 at [http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display\\_item.php?t=1&i=45](http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display_item.php?t=1&i=45).
- <sup>37</sup> Winston Peters in an address to a Southern African Business breakfast meeting, at <http://www.sanztrust.org.nz/winston.html>.
- <sup>38</sup> P. Hanson, *The Truth* (Ipswich: One Nation), 1997, pp. pp. 3, 7, 13, 15, 16, 25.
- <sup>39</sup> W. Peters, 'New Zealand's Identity Crisis – Colony or Nation', May 23, 2003 at [http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display\\_item.php?t=1&I=1018](http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display_item.php?t=1&I=1018); W. Peters, 'Sowing the Seeds of Sectarianism', November 10, 2002 at [http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display\\_item.php?t=1&i=787](http://www.nzfirst.org.nz/content/display_item.php?t=1&i=787).
- <sup>40</sup> Haider, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 93; U. Bossi and D. Vimercati, *La rivoluzione* (Milan: Kupfer & Sperling, 1993), pp. 205-206.
- <sup>41</sup> *Danmarks fremtid – dit land, dit valg ...* (Copenhagen: Dansk Folkeparti, 2001), pp. 28, 190-191.
- <sup>42</sup> F. Dewinter, 'Het groene totalitarisme: de kolonisatie van Europa!' November 20, 2002, Antwerp at [http://www.vlaamsblokantwerpen.org/toespraken\\_21.shtml](http://www.vlaamsblokantwerpen.org/toespraken_21.shtml).
- <sup>43</sup> Dewinter, *op. cit.*, Ref. 28, pp. 15-23.
- <sup>44</sup> Lega Nord, 'Mozione crocifissi,' 2003 at <http://www.leganord.org/pdf/mozioni/mozcrocifissi.pdf>.
- <sup>45</sup> M. Le Pen, October 2003 at <http://www.marine2004.com/compterenduusa.html>.
- <sup>46</sup> Vlaams Blok, *Aanpassen of terugkeren. Het vreemdingenstandpunt van het Vlaams Blok* (Brussels: Vlaams Blok, 2003).
- <sup>47</sup> R. Brubaker, 'The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24/4 (2001), p. 534.
- <sup>48</sup> D. Gianetti, 'Islam: regia occulta dietro l'invasione', *La Padania*, February 14, 2001.
- <sup>49</sup> Vlaams Blok, *op. cit.*, Ref. 46, p. 9.
- <sup>50</sup> Dewinter cited in R. v. d. Brink, *L'internationale de la haine* (Brussels: Luc Pire, 1996), p. 120.
- <sup>51</sup> T. Meier, 'Irrweg `multikulturelle Gesellschaft`', *Schweizerzeit*, March 3, 2000 at [http://www.thomas-meier.ch/artikel\\_sz.03.03.00.htm](http://www.thomas-meier.ch/artikel_sz.03.03.00.htm).
- <sup>52</sup> Enti Locali Padani Federali, *Padania, identità e società multirazziali*, December 1998, p. 4
- <sup>53</sup> K. McDonough, 'Cultural Recognition, Cosmopolitanism and Multicultural Education,' *Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook 1997* at [http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/97\\_docs/mcdonough.html](http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/97_docs/mcdonough.html).
- <sup>54</sup> The heuristic value of the ethnocratic concept was pointed out by Roger Griffin in his essay "Afterword: Last Rites?" *op. cit.*, Ref. 1, pp. 308-315.
- <sup>55</sup> N. A. Butenschøn, 'Politics of Ethnocracy: Strategies and Dilemmas of Ethnic Domination,' Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, 1993 at <http://www.statsvitenskap.uio.no/ansatte/serie/notat/fulltekst/0193/index.html>; J. Mostov, 'La fonction de l'ethnocratie', *Transeuropeennes*, 8 (1996), p. 36, cited in I. Ivekovic, 'The Israeli Ethnocracy and the Bantustanization of Palestine', *Revista de ciencias sociales*, 4 (2002), p. 123.
- <sup>56</sup> A. Wimmer, 'Dominant Ethnicity and Dominant Nationhood', in E. Kaufman (Ed.), *Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities: Conceptualizing Dominant Ethnicity* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2004); A. Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflicts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 7.
- <sup>57</sup> U. Bossi, 'Intervento del segretario federale, On. Umberto Bossi,' June 4, 2000, Pontida at [http://www.leganord.org/a\\_2\\_discorsi\\_pontida\\_4\\_06\\_2000.htm](http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_pontida_4_06_2000.htm).

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- <sup>58</sup> J.-M. Le Pen, speech at the Université d'été du Front national, Orange, 1999 at [http://www.frontnational.com/lesdiscours.php?id\\_inter=8](http://www.frontnational.com/lesdiscours.php?id_inter=8).
- <sup>59</sup> Enti Locali Padani Federali, *op. cit.*, Ref. 52, p. 15.
- <sup>60</sup> Lega Nord, *op. cit.*, Ref. 32, p. 21.
- <sup>61</sup> SVP, *Wahlplattform 2003 bis 2007* (Berne: Schweizerische Volkspartei, 2003), p. 22.
- <sup>62</sup> See J.-M. Le Pen, 'Discours de Jean-Marie Le Pen', May 1, 1997 at <http://www.front-nat.fr/jeanne.html>; 'Discourse de Jean-Marie Le Pen lors du dernier Congrès du Front National, le 30 avril 2000' at [http://www.frontnational.com/lesdiscours.php?id\\_inter=12](http://www.frontnational.com/lesdiscours.php?id_inter=12).
- <sup>63</sup> FPÖ, 'NEIN --- heißt JA zu Neuverhandlungen', flyer, 1994.
- <sup>64</sup> SVP poster reproduced in J. Steinberg, *Why Switzerland?* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 111.
- <sup>65</sup> C. Blocher, 'Suchst Du den Krieg, dann kommt er zu Dir!' Albisgüetli-Rede 2001, Zurich, 2001, pp. 12-13.
- <sup>66</sup> SVP, *op. cit.*, Ref. 61, p. 22.
- <sup>67</sup> See the chapter entitled "Werk en sociale voorzieningen voor eigen volk eerst (jobs and social benefits for the own people first)" in *Aanpassen of terugkeren*, pp. 21-25.
- <sup>68</sup> R. Mark, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11.
- <sup>69</sup> The quote is from an article by the general secretary of the SVP, Gregor A Rutz, 'Le PS, le PRD et le PDC détruisent notre pays!' at [http://www.svp.ch/index.html?page\\_id=548&l=3](http://www.svp.ch/index.html?page_id=548&l=3). For the centrality of "welfare chauvinism" in radical right-wing populist ideology see, for example, C. Mudde, *op. cit.*, Ref. 5, pp. 174-175; J. G. Andersen, 'Denmark: the Progress Party – Populist Neo-Liberalism and Welfare State Chauvinism', in Paul Hainsworth (Ed.), *The Extreme Right in Europe and in the USA* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 198-199; T. Bjørklund and J. Saglie, 'The Norwegian Progress Party: Building Bridges Across Old Cleavages', paper presented at the 12<sup>th</sup> Nasjonal fagkonferanse i statsvitenskap, Tromsø, January 7-9, 2004, p. 18 at <http://uit.no/getfile.php?PageId=1410&FileId=171>.
- <sup>70</sup> J.-M. Le Pen, "Immigration et souveraineté," January 27, 2003, Paris at [http://www.frontnational.com/lesdiscours.php?id\\_inter=34](http://www.frontnational.com/lesdiscours.php?id_inter=34).
- <sup>71</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, for example, raises the question of whether "the multiculturalization of still by and large homogeneous or ethnically stable Western Europe [will] lead to a decline of the welfare state." H. Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 258-259. For an extensive discussion of the question see K. Banting and W. Kymlicka, 'Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?' School of Policy Studies, Working Paper 33, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, August 2003 at [http://www.queensu.ca/sps/WorkingPapers/files/sps\\_wp\\_33.pdf](http://www.queensu.ca/sps/WorkingPapers/files/sps_wp_33.pdf).
- <sup>72</sup> B. Villalba, 'Jean-Marie Le Pen et l'usage politique de la quête des signatures', in A. Gattolin and F. Miquet-Marty (Eds.), *La France blessée* (Paris: Denoël, 2003), pp. 79-80.
- <sup>73</sup> Roger Griffin, "<http://www.brookes.ac.uk/schools/humanities/Roger/2457/POSTWAR.htm> Interregnum or Endgame?"
- <sup>74</sup> As Andreas Wimmer has pointedly put it: 'The discrimination against aliens is so deeply inscribed in the institutional structures of modern states and their legal machinery that it is not perceived as running against basic principles of political modernity – rather, it is taken for granted as the way things have always been.' A. Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 56, p. 222.
- <sup>75</sup> See T. Bale, 'Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems', *West European Politics*, 26/3 (2003), pp. 67-90; C. Johnson, 'The Dilemmas of Ethnic Privilege: A Comparison of Constructions of 'British', 'English' and 'Anglo-celtic' Identity in Contemporary British and Australian Political Discourse', *Ethnicities*, 2/2 (2002), pp. 163-188.
- <sup>76</sup> A. Wimmer, 'Explaining Xenophobia and Racism: A Critical Review of Current Research', *Racial and Ethnic Studies*, 20/1 (1997), p. 32.
- <sup>77</sup> As Ron Mark has put it referring to the Labour administration in New Zealand: "Already today, [it] is seen as more arrogant, more aloof, more elitist, more out of touch with working class New Zealanders than any party in the history of our nation." R. Mark, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11.