

March 26. 29

Cuffie's Corner. Frost Row. - Sussex

My dear Fisher.

I was glad to see Minchin again. It seems to me a good bit of work, and we hope it may make wiser biologists see that some of their problems can only be attacked mathematically or numerically.

Your Chap VIII seems to me to be one of the ~~eff~~ most interesting in the book, and very well written. I have made a few notes in the margin where it seems to me improvements might be made. One idea one sentence is, I think, a good rule. All about ants interested me much.

In all essentials I see no reason to differ from you. A few minor points we don't see eye to eye. I cannot agree with what you say on p 2 about the elephants trunks. The brain seems to me a far more complicated affair. All that I could say would be, ^{is} that the trunk is, like the brain, such a complicated affair that we are quite incapable of fully understanding its action.

I don't agree with what you say as to my father's view. See the first pages of my Organic Evolution. He thought evolution, I believe, of enormous importance in itself as helping to

construct many facts. — in geology, Embryology, &c. He felt that damard had not opened his eyes, and without a real cause he could not open the eye of others. P. XX. 13.

Then on your p. 4, you seem to me to ride far too easily over the greatest difficulty in human thought — uniformity and free-will. You don't help me to get over my difficulties set forth on p 510 of my book, which I will not here repeat. You said to me once, in this connection, that an equation may have two solutions. I take ^{it} that you mean that I cannot assume that all forces acting on us at one time can only have one resultant. Granted. But what is it which decides which solution shall be adopted, or which resultant followed? Both solutions fit the equation, and it cannot be the terms of the equation which decide which is adopted. You look on Consciousness as a definitely heritable thing. So do I. But, on the other hand, I do not see how such a definitely heritable thing can decide ~~between~~ between two definite courses of action, both of which are possible at the moment, and both therefore, ~~not~~ fit the conditions of the consciousness. I find myself forced to ~~suspect~~ have force

Up till now
I have
of choice

work, and also bound to believe I have an
unhanded conscience — and the two ideas
seem to me contradictory. It is the mystery
of mystery, which do not happen to
have solved! I have talked this matter over
with Ward of Cambridge, a lady philosopher
of Bedford College, and have written about it
to Alfred Morgan. I believe any day I have
not talked what philosophers would regard
as nonsense.

Yours sincerely

Leonard Darwin

I am writing ~~out~~ something, in which I
touch on Social policy, from a rather
different angle.

See life of my father Vol II misadvi
between p 4 & 5. Would not a
Lamarckian explanation, if it were
true, do most of these things?