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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/106687
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware |
Author: | Ge, Q. Yarom, Y. Cock, D. Heiser, G. |
Citation: | Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2018; 8(1):1-27 |
Publisher: | Springer-Verlag |
Issue Date: | 2018 |
ISSN: | 2190-8508 2190-8516 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock, Gernot Heiser |
Abstract: | Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware states though timing. We survey recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they are relevant for cloud computing. We classify types of attacks according to a taxonomy of the shared resources leveraged for such attacks. Moreover, we take a detailed look at attacks used against shared caches. We survey existing countermeasures. We finally discuss trends in attacks, challenges to combating them, and future directions, especially with respect to hardware support. |
Keywords: | Microarchitectural timing attacks; cache-based timing attacks; countermeasures; trend in the attacks |
Description: | Published online: 26 December 2016 |
Rights: | © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6 |
Grant ID: | ARC |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 3 Computer Science publications |
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