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|Title:||Chance, determinism, and unsettledness|
|Citation:||Philosophical Studies, 2019; 176(3):781-802|
|Abstract:||A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.|
|Keywords:||Chance; determinism; unsettledness; indeterminacy; laws; undermining; context-dependence|
|Rights:||© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy publications|
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