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|Title:||Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control|
|Author:||Fredriksson, Per G.|
|Citation:||Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2005; 49 (2):343-365|
|School/Discipline:||School of Economics|
|Per G. Fredriksson, Eric Neumayer, Richard Damania and Scott Gates|
|Abstract:||This paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature, based on predictions generated by a lobby group model. First, we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries. Second, we explore the interaction between democratic participation and political (electoral) competition. The empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to positively affect the stringency of environmental policy. Moreover, political competition tends to raise policy stringency, in particular where citizens’ participation in the democratic process is widespread.|
|Keywords:||Environmentalism; Democracy; Environmental regulations; Policy|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics publications|
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