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Type: Journal article
Title: Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control
Author: Fredriksson, Per G.
Neymayer, E.
Damania, Richard
Gates, S.
Citation: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2005; 49 (2):343-365
Publisher: Elsevier
Issue Date: 2005
ISSN: 0095-0696
School/Discipline: School of Economics
Statement of
Per G. Fredriksson, Eric Neumayer, Richard Damania and Scott Gates
Abstract: This paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature, based on predictions generated by a lobby group model. First, we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries. Second, we explore the interaction between democratic participation and political (electoral) competition. The empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to positively affect the stringency of environmental policy. Moreover, political competition tends to raise policy stringency, in particular where citizens’ participation in the democratic process is widespread.
Keywords: Environmentalism; Democracy; Environmental regulations; Policy
RMID: 0020050176
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2004.04.004
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Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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