Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/16849
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dc.contributor.authorWilson, J. K.en
dc.contributor.authorDamania, Richarden
dc.date.issued2005en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2005; 49 (3):516-535en
dc.identifier.issn0095-0696en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/16849-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the interplay between corruption, political competition, environmental policy and environmental outcomes. An important feature of the model, which has been neglected in the existing literature, is that corruption may occur at different levels of government, such as the payment of bribes to politicians who determine policies, or bureaucrats who administer environmental regulations. We analyse the relationship between political competition and environmental outcomes in a model of stratified corruption and identify the benefits and limits of political competition. Our results suggest that while political competition may yield policy improvements, it cannot eliminate corruption at all levels of government.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityJohn K. Wilson and Richard Damaniaen
dc.description.urihttp://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622870/description#descriptionen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.titleCorruption, political competition and environmental policyen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Economicsen
dc.identifier.rmid0020050491en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jeem.2004.06.004en
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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