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|Title:||Intention: Meaning in relation|
|Citation:||Intention in Law and Philosophy, 2001 / Naffine, N., Owens, R., Williams, J. (ed./s), pp.187-215|
|Publisher:||Dartmouth Publishing Co, Ashgate Publishing Ltd|
|Publisher Place:||Gower House, Croft Rd, Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR, UK|
|Abstract:||The meaning of an action is what we call its intention. This meaning (intention) is not limited to the purpose of the action. The law which accounts for collective intentionality is the law of love. The law which accounts for collective intentionality is the law of love. Searle's account of collective intentionality was underdeveloped in the matter of its law, and underdeveloped also in its real collectiveness. With individualistic intention there is a one-to-one correspondence between the causal and the phenomenal, hence the problem of the epiphenomenal. The law of torts often puzzles over the relation between negligence and the seemingly peripheral cases of intention. Individualised intention produces a scandalous array of insoluble conundrums. Everyone accepts that meaning and intention are functions of mind; the issue is whether they are solely functions of the relations of minds. The issue of intentional fault is always the structural one of the relation of the minds involved and its breach.|
|Appears in Collections:||Aurora harvest 6|
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