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|dc.identifier.citation||Games and Economic Behavior, 2006; 54(1):47-76||en|
|dc.description.abstract||We present a formal model of political competition under approval voting which allows for endogenous candidate entry. Our analysis yields a number of novel insights. First, we develop a notion of sincere voting behavior under approval voting, called relative sincerity. We then show that the relatively sincere voting behavior is consistent with the strategic calculus of voting. Second, we show that in a one-dimensional model with distance preferences, equilibria in relatively sincere strategies and without spoiler candidates always generate outcomes close to the median voter. Moreover, approval voting satisfies Duverger's Law in the sense that there are at most two winning positions! Finally, we extend our analysis to arbitrary policy spaces. In the general setting, approval voting is shown to be susceptible to the same kinds of problems as the plurality rule, such as the possibility of non-majoritarian outcomes, failure to elect the Condorcet winner and existence of spoiler candidates.||en|
|dc.description.statementofresponsibility||Arnaud Dellis and Mandar P. Oak||en|
|dc.publisher||Academic Press Inc||en|
|dc.rights||© 2005 Elsevier||en|
|dc.subject||Approval voting; citizen-candidate model; comparison of electoral systems||en|
|dc.title||Approval voting with endogenous candidates||en|
|dc.identifier.orcid||Oak, M. [0000-0002-7018-8737]||en|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics publications|
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